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FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION
KEVIN K. WASHBURN*
Under the rubric of "tribal self-determination," federal
policymakers have shifted federal governmental power and control
to tribal governments in nearly all areas of Indian policy.
Normatively, this shift reflects an enlightened view about the role of
Indian tribes in Indian policy. As a practical matter, it has also
improved services to Indians on reservations by placing functions
with tribal service providers who are more knowledgeable and
more accountable than their federal counterparts. Despite broad
adoption of self-determination as the dominant federal policy,
felony criminal justice on Indian reservations has remained an
exclusive federal function, and a highly ineffective enterprise,
according to critics, because the crime rate is worse for American
Indians than any other ethnic group. The failure to embrace self-
determination in federal Indian country criminal justice is curious.
Criminal law has a central role in shaping and expressing
community values and identity. And a community that cannot
create its own definition of right and wrong cannot be said in any
meaningful sense to have achieved true self-determination. Tracing
the history of the century-old Indian Major Crimes Act, it is clear
that the Act's original purposes, increasing federal control and
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encouraging assimilation, are aimed at colonization and lack
legitimacy in the modern era. Since the 1960s, mainstream federal
Indian policy has become much more enlightened and the Major
Crimes Act has become an embarrassing anachronism. Tribal self-
determination strategies in criminal justice could help tribes get
closer to true self-determination and help Indian country recover
from the current criminal justice crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
Crime is a serious public safety crisis on American Indian
reservations. Serious felonies occur at shocking rates and the crime
rate for Indians has been steadily increasing even while urban crime
rates have declined tremendously. One key difference between
serious offenses in urban communities and felonies on Indian
reservations is the government charged with addressing them. On
more than a hundred Indian reservations across the United States,
felony criminal justice is not a job for the local government, but a
federal responsibility. As a result, though violent felonies tend to be
local crimes affecting local communities, such offenses in Indian
country tend to be adjudicated in federal courts.
Hundreds of miles of desert landscape and lonely highways often
separate the small, mostly rural Indian communities where these
federal crimes occur from the urban federal courts where they are
eventually tried.' But even though this physical distance is
tremendous, it is dwarfed by an even greater distance: the vast
cultural gulf between the tribal communities and the federal courts.
In a recent article, this author argued that two key institutions of
the federal Indian country criminal justice system-the federal
prosecutors and federal juries-violate fundamental norms of
American criminal justice.2 First, American criminal justice policy
and theory requires prosecutors to be "of the community" to exercise
prosecutorial power over local offenses properly.' Echoing former
1. See Christopher B. Chaney, Victim Rights in Indian Country-An Assistant United
States Attorney Perspective, U.S. ATT'Ys' BULL., Jan. 2003, at 36, 36 (noting that it is 381
miles from the federal courthouse in Salt Lake City to the Navajo community of
Monument Valley, Utah).
2. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV.
709, 714-15 (2006).
3. Id. at 729-30.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's notion that "[f]ederal courts were not
created to adjudicate local crimes,' the article explained that the
physical and cultural distances undermine the institutional
competence of federal prosecutors.' Likewise, federal juries in Indian
country cases are routinely constructed in violation of Sixth
Amendment guarantees.6 Because these juries do not represent fair
cross-sections of the communities over which the federal courts have
jurisdiction, the convictions they produce are illegitimate and
unconstitutional.
Though these flaws in the structure of the Indian country
criminal justice system are serious, they could be corrected. They are,
after all, related primarily to process, not substance. If the role of
Indian country federal prosecutor is adjusted to make prosecutors
institutionally more competent, and if the federal courts begin
selecting juries from within federal Indian country rather than using
jurors who reside geographically outside those communities, the
federal Indian country system could become aligned more closely
with prevailing criminal justice and constitutional norms. The system
might then be viewed as lawful from a federal constitutional
perspective and rational from an American criminal justice policy
perspective.
However, even with such corrections, a serious substantive
problem remains. Thus, this Article addresses a far deeper problem
with the federal Indian country criminal justice regime. The federal
Indian country criminal justice regime reflects the unilateral
imposition, by an external authority, of substantive criminal norms on
separate and independent communities without their consent and
often against their will. Thus, even if prosecutors performed their
work in accordance with sensible criminal justice policy, and even if
juries were selected in accordance with the Sixth Amendment, these
actors would nevertheless be enforcing laws not made by Indian
tribes. This is the essence of colonialism. And despite efforts to undo
the harmful effects of American colonialism in Indian country, the
imposition of federal criminal norms upon tribes has never been
addressed.
The federal laws that give rise to federal jurisdiction over felony
offenses have their most important roots in the Major Crimes Act,
4. William H. Rehnquist, Federalization of Crimes: Chief Justice Rehnquist on
Federalization of Crimes, PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr. 1999, at 9, 9.
5. Washburn, supra note 2, at 729-40.
6. Id. at 741-64.
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enacted by Congress in 1885.1 The Major Crimes Act federalized
prosecutions of serious crimes between Indians on reservations, a
subject that had theretofore been considered an exclusive matter for
internal tribal governance.8 By thrusting the federal government into
the adjudication of offenses between tribal members, the Major
Crimes Act was a monumental encroachment on the sovereign
powers of Indian tribal governments and a tremendous expansion of
federal authority over Indian tribes and Indian people.9 At the time,
official federal policy was to destroy tribal governments and
encourage assimilation of individual Indians into the larger society."
In the 120 years since the enactment of the Major Crimes Act,
the assimilationist policies that motivated its passage have been
largely rejected," and most of the contemporaneous laws that sought
to facilitate assimilation have been repealed. 2 Indeed, during the last
thirty-five years, Congress, the courts, and the executive branch have
established a new federal Indian policy in favor of the preservation
and reinvigoration of tribal governments. 3 The federal government
now respectfully recognizes Indian nations as sovereigns and
celebrates its "government-to-government" relationship with tribes.14
Rather than seeking to destroy tribal governments, expand federal
power over tribes, or assimilate individual Indians, the United States
7. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)).
8. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883).
9. See 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 679 (1984) (describing the Major Crimes
Act as "revolutionary," and noting that it was a "major blow at the integrity of the Indian
tribes").
10. See id. at 609 ("The drive to acculturate and assimilate the American Indians
culminated in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.").
11. See, e.g., Richard Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970), in
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 256, 256-58 (Francis Paul Prucha ed.,
3d ed. 2000) (explaining that the United States must reject the approach that "[t]ribal
property [shiould be divided among individual members who would then be assimilated
into the society at large" and indicating that "[s]elf-determination among the Indian
people can and must be encouraged").
12. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 14 (1983) (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and its dismantling
of the allotment policies and imposing restrictions on further losses of Indian lands).
13. See infra Part III.D-E.
14. See Memorandum from George W. Bush to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: Government-to-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments (Sept. 23,
2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040923-4.html.
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
now officially encourages "tribal self-determination"15 and "tribal
self-governance."16
Yet, as other major areas of federal Indian policy have been
transformed, the Major Crimes Act has stubbornly persisted in its
original form. Indeed, while other federal initiatives aimed at
assimilation were dismantled, the Major Crimes Act has actually been
expanded-repeatedly.7 As a consequence, even though it seems to
represent an anachronistic legal regime from a bygone era, the Major
Crimes Act is an even greater obstacle to tribal self-governance in the
twenty-first century than when it was first enacted in the nineteenth
century. Indeed, while its mere existence is anachronistic in light of
prevailing policy, its steady expansion means that it undermines tribal
self-governance today more than ever.
The omission of felony criminal justice from federal initiatives
favoring tribal self-determination is curious. Indeed, criminal law is
perhaps the most important formal institution through which a
community defines itself.18 In the words of criminal law scholar Dan
Kahan, criminal law is "suffused with meaning."19  Whether one
considers the substantive conduct that a community chooses to
punish, the procedures that the community uses to adjudicate
offenses, or even the types of punishment that the community
authorizes the courts to mete out, such decisions reflect important
values that help the community define itself and its moral vision.2"
One need only look at substantive provisions in state criminal
codes to understand the power of this fundamental truth. Consider
that, in Texas, a person is privileged to kill a thief to prevent the
person from successfully stealing property.2' In contrast, in California
and in many other states, one may never use deadly force to defend
mere property and may use such force only to prevent grave physical
15. For an understanding of this term, see infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text.
16. See Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. II, 108 Stat. 4250
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa-458hh (2000)).
17. See infra Part II1.G (discussing amendment and expansion of the Major Crimes
Act).
18. See EMILE DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 73 (George Simpson
trans., MacMillan Co. 1933) (1893).
19. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 362 (1997).
20. See id.
21. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.41-.42 (Vernon 1994) (allowing, generally, one
to use force to protect one's property and even allowing the use of deadly force against a
burglar, robber, or night time thief during flight if one reasonably believes that the
property cannot be recovered any other way).
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harm or death to a person.22 These laws express far more than their
respective communities' views about crime; they constitute key
expressions of the relative value of property and human life in those
communities. All criminal laws express value judgments of one kind
or another. At bottom, criminal laws are perhaps the most important
community expressions of social norms and community values. They
are thus fundamental to community identity and self-determination.
It is no accident that many of the most important and
controversial principles of federal Indian law have been established in
criminal cases. In Ex parte Crow Dog,23 United States v. Kagama,24
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,2 Duro v. Reina,26 and even as
recently as United States v. Lara,2 the Supreme Court struggled with
the extent of tribal sovereignty and federal authority over criminal
justice. The facts and legal issues in these criminal cases have been
compelling to the Supreme Court at least in part because of the stakes
involved when a government seeks to impose its criminal laws-its
most important social norms-on people of another community.
While Indian law scholars and others occasionally voice criticism
of federal Indian country criminal justice, 28 no scholar has ever
seriously examined federal Indian criminal justice in light of the
norms animating modern federal Indian law and policy. This Article
22. See People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241, 249 (Cal. 1974); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:3-6 (West 1987) (placing limitations on the use of deadly force in the defense of
property). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
§ 20.02[3] (3d ed. 2001) (analyzing the legal doctrines regarding the defense of property);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.6 (4th ed. 2003) (same).
23. 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (holding that the federal government lacks general authority
to enforce federal criminal laws in Indian country).
24. 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (finding that federal criminal law specifically enacted for
Indian country is not justified by congressional authority under the Commerce Clause but
nevertheless holding that such power is legitimate).
25. 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that an Indian tribe lacks jurisdiction to enforce its
criminal laws against a non-Indian).
26. 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that an Indian tribe lacks jurisdiction to enforce its
criminal laws against an Indian who is not a member of that tribe).
27. 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that the congressional act overruling Duro v. Reina
was a lawful exercise of congressional plenary authority over Indian tribes and properly
allowed the tribe to assert criminal authority over Indians who are not tribal members).
28. Professor Robert Clinton's work at the dawn of the self-determination era in the
1970s remains the best resource on the federal Indian country criminal jurisdictional
scheme. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A
Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976) [hereinafter Clinton,
Criminal Jurisdiction]; Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over
Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 951 (1975) [hereinafter
Clinton, Development]. Professor Robert Odawi Porter has also offered insights into the
problems with federal criminal justice. Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas
to Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 993-98 (1998).
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seeks to remedy that oversight. At a time when Congress and the
federal courts have demonstrated frustration with the existing
criminal justice regime in Indian country, this Article evaluates this
federal regime against the prevailing normative standard of "tribal
self-determination."
Part I describes the contours of the existing system and notes
some of the perceived problems. Part II explores the history and
doctrinal foundations of the Major Crimes Act, tracing the historical
context of federal criminal jurisdiction leading up to its enactment.
Part III places the Major Crimes Act in the broader context of Indian
law and policy in the century that has followed its enactment and
concludes that the Indian country criminal justice regime is
anachronistic and inconsistent with the modern norm of tribal
sovereignty and self-governance. Part IV explains why criminal law is
fundamentally important in achieving tribal self-determination and, in
turn, why the absence of tribal self-determination undermines the
legitimacy of the federal Indian country criminal justice system.
Finally, Part V identifies broad approaches to reform and begins the
discussion of how to implement tribal self-determination in this most
important area of law and community life.
I. THE EXISTING CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR RE-EVALUATION
Though Congress has often justified imposition of the federal
criminal justice system in Indian country on the theory that federal
laws are necessary to protect public safety, numerous statistical
surveys suggest that the federal Indian country criminal justice regime
has not achieved any such purpose.
Indeed, crime statistics involving American Indians are stunning.
For decades, crime rates involving Indians have been higher than any
other racial or ethnic group in the United States.29 During the 1990s,
when violent crime was rapidly declining throughout the United
States to levels not seen in thirty years,30 violent crime was quickly
rising on Indian reservations.31
29. In addition to those reports cited in greater detail below, for an overview of the
crime rates and violence sustained among Indians, see generally RONET BACHMAN,
DEATH AND VIOLENCE ON THE RESERVATION: HOMICIDE, FAMILY VIOLENCE, AND
SUICIDE IN AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATIONS (1992); L.J. DAVID WALLACE ET AL.,
HOMICIDE AND SUICIDE AMONG NATIVE AMERICANS, 1979-1992, VIOLENCE
SURVEILLANCE SUMMARY SERIES No. 2 (1996), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/
pub-res/hombook.pdf; and Sidney Harring, Native American Crime in the United States, in
INDIANS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93 (Laurence French ed., 1982).
30. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SERIOUS
VIOLENT CRIME LEVELS DECLINED SINCE 1993, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
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Department of Justice researchers have concluded, incredibly,
that 34.1% of American Indian women will be raped during their
lifetimes,32 reflecting the fact that sexual offenses against women and
children are especially serious problems in Indian country.33 This rate
is approximately twice the rate for white women.3" The problem has
spawned a robust academic literature focused solely on this aspect of
the Indian country crime problem.35
While these data are not linked solely to Indian reservations and
thus tend to blur our understanding of the problem, federal crime
statistics also demonstrate that Indians are far more likely than
members of all other minority groups to be victims of violent crime.
An American Indian or Alaska Native is two-and-a-half times more
likely than a member of the general public to be a victim of violent
crime and twice as likely as an African American.36 From 1992
through 2001, the average annual rate of violent victimizations among
Indians was 101 per 1,000 residents twelve years of age and older,37
glance/cv2.htm (last modified Oct. 17, 2005) (reporting that serious violent crime declined
beginning in 1993, and for the rest of the 1990s); see also United States Department of
Justice's Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Environment and Natural Resources Division,
and Executive Office for U.S. Trustees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 20 (1998) [hereinafter
Judiciary Hearing] (testimony of Donna A. Bucella) ("Homicides have risen 87 percent in
Indian Country since 1992 while, nationwide, homicides have declined by roughly 16
percent during that time.").
31. The Administration's Proposed Indian Law Enforcement Initiative: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 44 (1998) [hereinafter Indian Affairs
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Inouye, Vice Chairman, Committee on Indian Affairs) ("[A]t
a time when, nationally, the violent crime rate has dropped almost 17 percent since 1992,
and the homicide rate has declined about 22 percent[,] the rates of violent crimes and
homicides have continued to rise on Indian reservations." (original in all capital letters)).
32. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT
ON THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 22 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf.
33. Id. at 22, Exhibit 7.
34. Id. According to Tjaden and Thoennes, 17.7% of white women will be raped in
their lifetime. Cumulative statistics indicate that the figure is 18.2% for all women, and
18.8% for African American women, making American Indian women (at 34.1%) far
more vulnerable than other women. Id.
35. Larry Echohawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian Keeping
in Mind the Seventh Generation?, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 100-01 (2001);
Sumayyah Waheed, Domestic Violence on the Reservation: Imperfect Laws, Imperfect
Solution, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 287, 288-89 (2004); Amy Radon, Note, Tribal
Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the
Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1278 (2004).
36. STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 5-6
(2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf.
37. Id.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
compared to 50 violent victimizations per 1,000 blacks, 41 per 1,000
whites, and 22 per 1,000 Asians.38
To showcase a specific Indian reservation, during a recent nine
month period on the Red Lake Chippewa Reservation (population
5,000) in northern Minnesota, five separate homicides occurred.39
The school shooting on the same reservation in March 2005 that left
ten people dead brought extraordinary media attention,40 but that
tragic event occurred against the backdrop of an already severe
baseline homicide rate. And Red Lake's population, geographic
isolation, poverty level, and other demographic and socioeconomic
indicia are not atypical of rural American Indian reservations across
the West.41
Outside academia, reservation crime has prompted extraordinary
reactions from the federal judges who regularly preside over Indian
country cases. The federal reporters contain unusual social
commentary from federal judges, highlighting both the seriousness of
the problem and reflecting tremendous frustration among the federal
officials who are charged with perhaps the single most important
responsibility in addressing it.42
Consider this introduction to a recent Ninth Circuit opinion:
"This case is a powerful indictment of the criminal justice system.
Our social and penal policies are failing to alleviate alcohol abuse on
Indian reservations and the crime to which it gives rise. ' 43
38. Id.
39. See Margaret Zack, State-Federal Project Fights Reservation Violent Crime,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Aug. 30, 2002, at B2.
40. Jodi Wilgoren, Shooting Rampage by Student Leaves 10 Dead on Reservation,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,2005, at Al.
41. Cf. PERRY, supra note 36, at 42 (quantifying the known statistics and explaining
that such statistics are nevertheless incomplete in light of the failure to obtain relevant
statistics from the Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal law enforcement agencies).
42. See Hubelling v. United States, 288 F.3d 363, 368-69 (8th Cir. 2002) (Heaney, J.,
concurring) ("While [investigation and prosecution of sexual abuse cases and treatment of
victimsl are necessary, I would suggest that ... federal funds and policies must be directed
towards alleviating the conditions which give rise to such abuse. Living conditions on the
reservations must be improved, and alcoholism must be effectively treated, or future
generations of Native American children will continue to be scarred by the trauma of this
crime."); United States v. Miner, 131 F.3d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1997) (Bright, J.,
concurring) (lamenting the increase in sexual abuse cases on reservations and calling for
action to improve the conditions on reservations to prevent such cases).
43. United States v. Bad Marriage, 392 F.3d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004). The court
reversed a decision by the district court to depart from official guidelines for assault
resulting in serious bodily injury to increase the sentence for Bad Marriage, a member of
the Blackfeet tribe with an extensive history of substance abuse and criminal behavior. Id.
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The tremendous discomfort that federal judges have shown with
the cases may suggest, as Chief Justice Rehnquist has strongly
implied, that federal courts lack institutional competence for this kind
of work.' One federal judge formally expressed his chagrin in a
published opinion, "I did not realize, prior to taking office as an
Article III judge, that I would be presiding over drunk driving
cases."45  The unusual reaction by federal judges ought to be a
warning sign about the crime problem.
Indeed, the problem seems to have worsened even while
Congress has dramatically increased federal attention to Indian
country criminal justice. In 1997, the FBI reassigned thirty agents to
Indian country units to address violent crime.46 In 1998, Congress and
the Department of Justice proposed the appointment of twenty-six
new Assistant United States Attorneys to address Indian country
issues.4 7  And in late 2004, Congress created twenty-seven new
positions in "the Indian Country Unit of the FBI to investigate crimes
in Indian Country. 48
If staffing levels in United States Attorney's Offices and the FBI
are any measure, the federal Indian country criminal justice regime
has been operating more aggressively than ever before. To provide a
representative example from one busy district with substantial Indian
country jurisdiction, federal prosecutors in the state and federal
judicial district of Arizona had more than 1,000 felony Indian country
prosecutions open in a recent year.49 More than 500 of those were
homicides or sex offenses. 50
44. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 9 ("Federal courts were not created to adjudicate
local crimes, no matter how sensational or heinous the crimes may be. State courts do,
can, and should handle such problems. While there certainly are areas in criminal law in
which the federal government must act, the vast majority of localized criminal cases should
be decided in the state courts which are equipped for such matters.").
45. United States v. Swift Hawk, 2000 DSD 52 $ 1, 125 F. Supp. 2d 384, 384-85.
United States District Court Judge Charles Kornmann continued: "Congress has seen fit
to impose altogether different penalties on Native Americans driving under the influence
in Indian Country as compared with those who drive under the influence elsewhere. Thus,
a person of German or Norwegian descent driving under the influence in Aberdeen, SD,
would not face nearly the same penalties as a Native American driving on one of the
reservations in South Dakota. Why Congress would have done this is beyond me." Id.
46. Indian Affairs Hearing, supra note 31, at 63 (statement of Janet Reno, Attorney
General of the United States).
47. See Judiciary Hearing, supra note 30, at 30 (testimony of Karen E. Schreier).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 108-792, at 727 (2004) (Conf. Rep. to Accompany H.R. 4818-
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005).
49. PAUL CHARLTON, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, 2003
INDIAN COUNTRY REPORT [hereinafter 2003 INDIAN COUNTRY REPORT]. The numbers
included all cases that were active during the one-year reporting period ending June 30,
2003, though some of them may have been referred during a previous year. Recently, the
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In addition to increasing the number of prosecutors and FBI
agents working Indian country cases, Congress has begun to show
interest in other ways as well. In November 2004, Congress directed
the Department of Justice to "provide quarterly reports to Congress
detailing efforts to reduce the violent victimization of Native
Americans, including efforts to reduce murder rates, serious assaults,
violence against women, and child abuse."'" While learning more
about the problem is surely important, at least one study has
cautioned federal policymakers against increasing resources for
Indian country policing until the federal government has engaged in a
comprehensive "rethinking" of the policy in the area.52 Congressional
and executive department policymakers have failed so far to follow
that advice.53
Congress has also justified expansion of criminal authority on the
seriousness of the crime problem. Yet as federal authority slowly
expands, the problem only continues to grow. In light of the inability
of the federal government to address this critical problem
successfully, this Article hypothesizes that the solutions may not lie in
greater resource allocation and broader federal authority. It looks for
ways to address the problem that are consistent with our
contemporary understanding of good government and successful
federal Indian policy. To understand the context, it is useful to trace
the history of federal activity in this area.
II. HISTORY LEADING TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE MAJOR CRIMES
ACT
A. Early Federal Recognition of Tribal Criminal Justice Autonomy
Before and during the formation of the United States, Indian
tribes were powerful and independent sovereign communities. The
United States Attorney's Office in Arizona changed its reporting methodology so that it
includes only cases referred and excludes those that were referred in a previous year but
remain active during the reporting period. PAUL CHARLTON, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA, 2004 INDIAN COUNTRY REPORT, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/indrpt04.html. Under the new reporting method, the United
States Attorney's Office reported that more than 500 cases were referred to the United
States Attorney's Office from July 1, 2003, through June 30, 2004. Id.
50. 2003 INDIAN COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 49.
51. H.R. REP. NO. 108-792, at 714.
52. STEWART WAKELING ET AL., POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS
11 (2001).
53. The National Institutes of Justice have, however, begun to issue requests for
proposals for grants to study some of these problems, though only in narrow areas.
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British, the French, and the colonists each tried to ally with tribes in
the sporadic warfare that accompanied the political struggle for
control of North America. 4 From the inception of the Articles of
Confederation through the adoption of the Constitution, the fledgling
United States lacked the resources to wage war against the Indian
tribes.55
In the early years of the Republic, the United States used
diplomacy and appeasement as well as negotiation and treaties to
deal with tribes.56 Diplomatic approaches were inherited from the
British who learned hard lessons in the French and Indian War and in
Pontiac's Rebellion in the 1750s-60s, culminating in appeasement
provisions in the Proclamation of 1763.1' Following Britain's tradition
of noninterference with internal tribal affairs, early federal officials
respected virtually exclusive tribal control over Indian lands.58  It is
from this baseline that federal criminal jurisdiction related to Indian
country began to develop.59
As agreements between sovereigns, treaties defined the early
relationships between the United States and the tribes.6° Statutes
executed those treaties within the domestic law of the United States.
A series of federal statutes called the Trade and Intercourse Acts61
modeled a British policy created in the Proclamation of 1763 by
consolidating federal authority over commerce with Indian tribes.62
54. Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries
of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV. 329, 369-
71(1989).
55. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 679.
56. See, e.g., 1 id. at 29-33 (discussing treaty councils and other diplomatic meetings).
57. See ROBERT WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT 236-37 (1990); Clinton, supra note 54, at 349-55, 371-72
58. See Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 953.
59. See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113,118-38 (2002).
60. See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 57 (noting that the United States "treated Indian
tribes with the same legal procedures used for foreign nations, a practice that
acknowledged some kind of autonomous nationhood of the Indian tribes" and that
"[m]any of the basic relations between the United States and the tribes were determined
by treaties, and the obligations incurred endured after the treaty-making process itself
ended").
61. The first Congress enacted the first Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790. See Act of
July 22, 1790, § 3, 1 Stat. 138 (1790). It was re-enacted with modifications on several
subsequent occasions, including 1796, 1802, 1817, and 1834, with other revisions occurring
at other times. See generally John Edward Barry, Comment, Oneida Indian Nation v.
County of Oneida: Tribal Rights of Action and the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1852 (1984) (discussing the impact of the Trade and Intercourse Act on
Oneida tribal concepts of land rights).
62. WILLIAMS, supra note 57, at 229-32; Clinton, supra note 54, at 354-60.
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Such laws safeguarded federal prerogatives vis-A-vis states in relations
with Indian tribes and prevented transactions and events that might
erupt into conflict.63
American treaties with Indians varied among the tribes and
evolved over time, but common to many treaties in the late 1700s
were provisions on law enforcement.6 In many treaties, the tribes
and the United States acknowledged the power of Indian tribes to
punish non-Indian offenders who intruded on Indian lands,65 and
tribes agreed to surrender to the United States for punishment any
Indians who committed serious crimes against non-Indians.66 These
"provisions for the extradition of criminals within Indian tribes" were
found as early as 1785.67
63. See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 89-114 (discussing the Trade and Intercourse Acts
and noting that they were intended and necessary to regulate white people in order to
avoid conflicts with the Indians).
64. Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 953-54. The United States entered into
its first treaty with the Delaware Nation in 1778. Id. That treaty contemplated that both
the tribe and the United States, as sovereign nations, would cooperate in law enforcement,
so that "crimes would be tried in 'a fair and impartial trial ... had by judges or juries of
both parties, as near as can be to the laws, customs, and usages of the contracting parties
and natural justice ......."Id. Many of the early treaties provided that Indian tribes had
jurisdiction over their lands, regardless of whether the parties were Indian or non-Indian.
Id. However, a 1789 treaty with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa,
Pottawatomi, and Sac Nations explicitly limited tribal criminal jurisdiction. Id. It
provided that non-Indians who committed robbery or murder on Indian land and Indians
who committed robbery or murder against non-Indians, whether on Indian land or not,
would be prosecuted in the state or territorial courts, rather than the tribal courts. Id.
Despite such intrusions on tribal jurisdiction, most treaties between 1855 and 1871 (such as
those with the Choctaw, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles which recognized nearly
unrestricted rights of self-government over matters affecting tribal members on tribal
land) at least guaranteed tribes jurisdiction over intra-tribal reservation crimes. Id. at 956.
65. The Treaty of Greenville with the Wyandots and Other Tribes stated:
If any citizen of the United States, or any other white person or persons, shall
presume to settle upon lands now relinquished by the United States, such citizen
or other person shall be out of the protection of the United States; and the Indian
tribe, on whose land the settlement shall be made, may drive off the settler, or
punish him in such manner as they shall think fit ....
Treaty of Greenville with the Wyandots and Other Tribes, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49; see also
Clinton, supra note 59, at 123 n.22 (stating that "almost every treaty the United States
signed immediately before and after the drafting of the United States Constitution"
contained similar language).
66. See Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 954 n.19 (citing provisions of various
treaties).
67. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883) (citing Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28,
1785, 7 Stat. 18).
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In the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1817,68 Congress first
authorized the federal government to prosecute Indians who
committed crimes against non-Indians on Indian lands and vice
versa,69 expanding federal power over Indians and tribes."0 In keeping
with the understanding that tribes were separate and distinct self-
governing entities, the Act contained two exceptions. First, the law
did not expand federal jurisdiction to crimes committed by one Indian
against another. 71  There simply was no federal interest in such
cases,72 and Congress did not seek to displace tribal jurisdiction or
authority over tribal offenses. Second, the law disclaimed jurisdiction
over Indians who had already been punished by the tribe.73 Thus,
federal prosecution was the last resort to be used in cases where the
Indian tribe refused to provide justice.74 Federal cases were not
intended to be routine.
68. Trade and Intercourse Act, §§ 1-2, 3 Stat. 383, 383 (1817) (providing that "any
Indian, or other person" who commits a crime on an Indian reservation "shall suffer the
like punishment as is provided by the laws of the United States for the like offences" and
that the federal courts "shall have, and are hereby invested with, full power and authority
to hear, try, and punish" these crimes).
69. The 1817 Act expressly provided that it should not be interpreted to abrogate any
allocations of jurisdiction previously determined in specific Indian treaties. Clinton,
Development, supra note 28, at 959. This law, called the General Crimes Act or the Indian
Country Crimes Act, is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000) and still contains
these exceptions. The General Crimes Act is often considered a sister statute to the Major
Crimes Act because the two statutes form the basis of all federal criminal prosecutions
within Indian country. The General Crimes Act is much broader than the Major Crimes
Act because it allows federal prosecutors to use any applicable federal law, and if none,
any state criminal law. The General Crimes Act extends the "general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States ... to the Indian country." Id. The General
Crimes Act thus incorporates many of the offenses in the Major Crimes Act, such as
arson, 18 U.S.C. § 81; assault, id. § 113; maiming, id § 114; larceny, id. § 661; murder, id.
§ 1111; manslaughter, id. § 1112); and sexual offenses, id. §§ 2241-2248. Perhaps more
importantly, it incorporates the Assimilative Crimes Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 13, a
statute that allows federal prosecutors to borrow state law if there is no federal statute on
point. However, the General Crimes Act explicitly does not apply to offenses committed
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
70. See Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 959.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
72. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1, 42 (2002).
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
74. See Trade and Intercourse Act, § 3, 3 Stat. 383, 383 (1817). This law was repealed
by a later law enacted in 1834 that made even more clear that Congress was not arrogating
to the United States the power to prosecute "crimes committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian." Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (1834); see
Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 959.
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Since the Trade and Intercourse laws had limited effect, through
most of the 1800s, treaties defined the respective roles of Indian tribes
and the United States as to law enforcement.75 Many treaties
included "bad man clauses" which created an extradition process that
allowed the United States to extradite Indian or non-Indian criminals
who sought haven on Indians lands.76
B. A Gradual Shift in Power
As time wore on, the 'political desire for appeasement of the
Indians began to wane and the balance of power between the United
States and tribes began to shift in favor of the United States.77 Indian
treaties became less favorable to tribes." Moreover, as settlers
became more politically powerful, even the less favorable treaties
were often ignored. In many cases, the federal government did not
bother affirmatively abrogating treaties. Rather, it simply remained
passive and ignored its own treaty obligations to protect Indians and
tribes from unlawful incursions by increasingly aggressive settlers.7 9
The mounting pressure from settlers took a toll. Tribes became much
more willing to negotiate toward their own removal from their
homelands. Ultimately, through negotiation and treaties with the
Indian tribes, the federal government succeeded in removing Indian
tribes from most eastern lands.80
75. See Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 955-58.
76. See Clinton, supra note 59, at 122 n.21 (collecting examples of bad man clauses
from treaties in the 1860s and explaining that the provisions were designed to facilitate
extradition of Indian offenders wanted by state officials for crimes committed off the
reservation); Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 954. Another example is set forth in
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S 556, 562-64 (1883) (quoting provisions of the 1868 Treaty of
Fort Laramie).
77. See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 527-33 (discussing the increasing imbalance in
power between tribes and the United States, the accompanying attitude that tribes should
not be treated as equals in the treaty-making process, and the resulting end to the treaty
era).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. For example, the negotiations over removal between the Chickasaw Nation and
the United States lasted more than a decade beginning in the 1820s. After federal officials
asked a delegation of Chickasaws to travel from their home in present-day Mississippi to
visit the Indian territory in present-day Oklahoma in the fall of 1828, the tribal leaders
rejected the offer of a new homeland: "The country in which we now live, is one that
pleases us .... We cannot consent to remove to a country destitute of a single
corresponding feature of the one in which we at present reside." ARRELL M. GIBSON,
THE CHICKASAWS 169 (1971) (quoting Report of Chickasaw Chiefs on Expedition to
West, June 19, 1829, Letters Received, Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, Chickasaw
Agency, National Archives, Microcopy 234, Roll 135). Ultimately, of course, the tribe
capitulated and moved westward in 1837. Id. at 182. Having been raised in Oklahoma, I
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Many tribes left lands that they had known for centuries and
were relocated to new lands where they had to re-establish
themselves.81 Although removal primarily affected eastern tribes,
western tribes also faced dislocations as the nineteenth century wore
on.8 2 Though some western tribes remained on or near their original
homelands, they ceded millions of acres, reserving from the cessions
only small fractions of their original lands, which came to be known,
of course, as Indian reservations. 3 Removal and the reservation
policies produced similar effects. The large cessions, small
reservations, increasing settlement by non-Indians, and social
upheaval left Indians vulnerable. As a result, the tribes negotiated
and renegotiated promises for cash payments; for goods and services;
such as rifles, blankets, and teachers; and for federal protection from
encroaching settlers. 8"
Though dislocation of Indian communities exacted heavy tolls on
tribal governing institutions, many customary tribal law enforcement
and criminal justice systems continued during this time. 5 Given the
tribal political instability and increased dependence on federal goods
and services, however, tribal law enforcement officials were not
necessarily independent of federal authority. Federal officials had
tremendous power and sometimes created de facto tribal "leaders"
have often been amused at my Chickasaw ancestors' first thoughts on seeing our new
homeland.
81. ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES 117-27 (7th
prtg. 1983) (discussing removal of the Choctaws, Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and
Seminoles to the Indian Territory-present-day Oklahoma-in the 1830s).
82. Efforts were made to remove some western tribes, but these efforts were not as
successful from the federal perspective. The Navajos were moved to Fort Sumner in an
episode commonly called the "Long Walk" in 1864, but the move was a disaster and the
Navajos were allowed to return to their homes for a short time years later in 1868. See 1
PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 452-57. Moreover, federal commitment to removal for Navajos
likely was not as great because settlers did not clamor for the arid homeland of the Navajo
in the same way that they yearned for Indian lands in the eastern United States.
83. See id. at 354-409 (discussing in detail the processes of moving Indian tribes in
Texas, New Mexico, Utah, California, Oregon, and Washington to reservations). For a
more general overview, see id. at 562-81.
84. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW:
NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 16 (1987).
85. When the Cherokees embarked on their "Trail of Tears" to Oklahoma, for
example, their government survived the journey. See Grant Foreman, Introduction to
JOHN HOWARD PAYNE, INDIAN JUSTICE: A CHEROKEE MURDER TRIAL IN
TAHLEQUAH IN 1840, at xxiv-xxv (Grant Foreman ed., Univ. Okla. Press 2002) (1933).
Their criminal court system, which had already been adapted to model state and federal
systems, was active in the 1840s even after removal. See PAYNE, supra, passim (describing
in detail a jury trial in the Cherokee Nation); see also WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN
POLICE AND JUDGES 21 (1966) (discussing the building of a Cherokee prison in
Tahlequah in 1874).
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simply by being strategic in whom they recognized for purposes of
negotiations with the tribe and who they allowed to assist in the
distribution of treaty goods. 8 6  Even while federal officials abused
their power,87 dramatic societal upheaval forced greater dependence
on the federal government.8 This dependence emerged as the norm
that would plague tribes for generations.
The area of law enforcement was an area in which tribal
dependence on federal authority was acute. In the latter half of the
nineteenth century, federal frontier law enforcement officials focused
on preventing violence between Indians and non-Indians.89 The
federal Indian Department hired officials called "Indian agents," who
coordinated the provision of government services and oversaw each
Indian reservation.90 Unfortunately, many Indian agents worked for
their own gain instead of the good of the tribes, and some were later
found to be corrupt.91
86. See Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal
Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 191, 206 (1989). The federal officials' powcr to create
tribal leaders is evident in Harring's description of Spotted Tail:
[His] power was no longer derived from the traditional consensus model of the
selection of Brule chiefs, but, at least in part, derived from the army and the Indian
agent. Lacking complete legitimacy, Spotted Tail had to rely on a great deal of
coercion and political maneuvering to maintain his authority.
Id.; see also 1 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 309 (describing how, when annuities were paid to
chiefs, they did not always reach all members of the tribe). Thus, government agents
could easily influence the power dynamics within a tribe according to how they distributed
annuities and rations.
87. In an example recently noted by Justice O'Connor in her majority opinion in
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), one effort by
federal Indian officials to force relocation of Indians
ended in disaster. The Chippewa were told they were required to be present at
Sandy Lake by October 25 to receive their 1850 annuity payment. By November
10, almost 4,000 Chippewa had assembled at Sandy Lake to receive the payment,
but the annuity goods were not completely distributed until December 2. In the
meantime, around 150 Chippewa died in an outbreak of measles and dysentery;
another 230 Chippewa died on the winter trip home to Wisconsin.
Id. at 180 (citations omitted).
88. See 2 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 676 ("[T]he formal end of treaty making [in 1871]
and the conscious intention thereby to denigrate the power of the chiefs resulted in a loss
of old systems of internal order without the substitution of new ones in their place.").
89. See HAGAN, supra note 85, at 123. Plains tribal law enforcement systems, which
were organized largely around the hunt, were no longer as meaningful in a society that was
no longer able to hunt. Id. at 12-13.
90. See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 328-32 (discussing the expansion and overhaul of
the Indian Department in the second half of the 1800s).
91. For example, one of the primary activities of the Indian Department was to
distribute annuities. Id. at 171. Yet, the Department's system of distribution was often
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Perhaps reflecting the diminished power of tribes as independent
sovereign governments and increasing federal dependency, Congress
indicated in 1871 that it would no longer handle Indian affairs
through treaty-making with Indian tribes but would proceed by
statute.92  Notwithstanding the separation-of-powers questions that
might be posed by such legislation,93 the law was never effectively
challenged. Thus, the treaty-making era abruptly ended and federal
Indian policy started proceeding through legislation.94
Meanwhile, the settlers' insatiable hunger for Indian land grew
unabated throughout the 1870s and 1880s. The economic motive for
obtaining Indian land coincided with a developing moral imperative
to "civilize" and "assimilate" the Indians.95 As Indian dependence
corrupt. Even the head of the Department described the system as "slip-shod," and one
long-time Indian agent spoke of extreme "derangements" in the system to the point that
"[o]ne would think that appropriations had been handled with a pitchfork." Id. at 172-73;
see also id. at 586 (describing fraud in provision of Indian goods).
92. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000) ("No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.") (originally enacted as Act of
March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-16 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (discussing constitutional questions regarding congressional and presidential
authority in dealings with Indian tribes). The problem is that Congress and the President
had effectively amended the Constitution by providing that treaties with Indian nations
would now involve review and approval by the House of Representatives, a structural
system strikingly different than the one envisioned at the time the Constitution was
drafted. Cf U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (placing power to make treaties in the hands of
the President, with review and approval by the Senate).
94. In large measure, legislative action after 1871 continued to resemble a bilateral
treaty negotiation model; the United States negotiated agreements (rather than treaties)
with tribes that it then took to the entire Congress (rather than only the Senate) for
ratification. See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 529-33 (discussing the transition from treaty-
making to agreement-making, and the fact that the latter included both Houses of
Congress). From the tribal perspective, the difference was hardly noticeable, at least at
first. Id. at 532-33 (noting that there was little practical difference between treaty-making
and agreement-making). However, the United States House of Representatives now had
a role in Indian affairs. Id. For legislation dealing with a particular tribe, Congress still
routinely seeks the assent of the tribal membership or tribal leadership. See Ann Laquer
Estin, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Long Shadow, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF
CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880s, 215-34 (Sandra L.
Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984) (discussing the negotiation of the Jerome
agreement, where officials tried to obtain tribal support for the allotment acts).
95. By 1884, the federal government was operating eighty-one boarding schools and
seventy-six day schools for Indian children. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior,
I ANN. REP. OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, Nov. 1, 1884, at III. Approximately
forty other schools were being operated by various church denominations, some with
contracts from the federal government. Id. at III-IV. By 1895, the United States was
spending more than $2 million per year to educate over 18,000 students in more than 200
institutions. FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE
THE INDIANS, 1880-1920, at 189-90 (1984).
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had increased, official contempt toward tribal governments and
traditional ways of life among Indian people also increased.96 Indian
Department officials sought even greater control over Indians,
including extending federal authority over traditional areas of
internal tribal governance. 97
C. The Pursuit of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction on Indian Lands
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the United States
did not presume the authority to prosecute an Indian who committed
a crime against another Indian on Indian lands.98 No federal interest
was perceived in such cases, and tribes had traditionally handled such
matters through internal governance mechanisms.99 Indian treaties at
least implicitly confirmed these baseline expectations."° As federal
Indian agents obtained more and more power over the weakening
tribes through positive sanctions such as favoritism, they were
frustrated by the lack of the negative coercive power, such as the
power to prosecute or imprison tribal dissidents. The Secretary of the
Interior explained the challenges perceived by the federal Indian
agents: "It is impossible to properly govern a barbarous people like
our wilder Indians without being able to inflict some punishment for
wrong-doing that shall be a real punishment to the offender.'' 1 1
Thus, the Secretary argued, the United States should assert authority
to prosecute offenses between Indians, at least in serious cases. 10 2
In 1874, a bill was introduced in Congress that attempted to
extend federal jurisdiction to Indians who committed serious crimes
96. In 1881, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the principal Indian affairs official,
indicated in a report to Congress that
the system of gathering the Indians in bands or tribes on reservations and carrying
to them victuals and clothes, thus relieving them of the necessity of labor, never
will and never can civilize them ....
If the Indians are to be civilized and become a happy and prosperous people,...
they must learn our language and adopt our modes of life.
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, II ANN. REP. OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE INTERIOR, Oct. 24, 1881, at 1-2.
97. See infra Part II.C-D.
98. See Clinton, supra note 59, at 135.
99. See id. at 122-23, 133-37.
100. See id. at 122-23.
101. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1 ANN. REP. OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, Nov. 1, 1879, at 71.
102. See Harring, supra note 86, at 223-24.
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against other Indians.1°3 The Senate committee with jurisdiction
expressed serious reservations about the bill:
The Indians, while their tribal relations subsist, generally
maintain laws, customs, and usages of their own for the
punishment of offenses. They have no knowledge of the laws of
the United States, and the attempt to enforce their own
ordinances might bring them in direct conflict with existing
statutes and subject them to prosecution for their violation.1°4
Though the bill failed to gain passage at that time, federal
officials overseeing Indian affairs continued to seek laws that would
give the United States jurisdiction over serious offenses by Indians
against other Indians."'
Federal officials made a variety of arguments in favor of such a
law. One of the arguments sounds oddly familiar in contemporary
debate regarding the treatment of American citizens charged with
terrorist acts. The Secretary of the Interior cited confusion as to
whether Apache Indians who had committed "outrages" in New
Mexico and Arizona ought to be treated as "prisoners of war or
criminals."1 °6  The problem was a practical one for the federal
government and its Indian agents. While federal criminal defendants
could lawfully be tried and executed, the law of war requires that
prisoners of war captured in battle must generally be held until the
end of hostilities and then released. 17 The Indian agents wanted
prosecutions that would lead to serious but lawful punitive measures,
such as execution, rather than simply engaging in a process that
103. See id.
104. Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 964 n.75 (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-367
(1874)).
105. The bill eventually passed the House in 1884, as an amendment to the Indian
Appropriations Bill, but was stricken by the Senate. See 16 CONG. REC. 928, 935 (1885).
According to Harring, virtually every annual report of the Secretary of the Interior in the
late 1870s advocated passage of a "major crimes" act. Harring, supra note 86, at 224.
106. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1 ANN. REP. OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE INTERIOR, Nov. 1, 1881, at VII-VIII.
107. See Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military
Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13, 71-74, 84-90 (1990) (discussing the law of nations as to
prisoners of war in 1862 and questioning the legality of execution of numerous Dakota
Indians following trials by military commissions); see also EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 353-57 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. &
J.W. Johnson & Co. 1859) (1758) (discussing the treatment of prisoners during and after
war). "Prisoners may be secured; and for this purpose they may be put into confinement."
Id. at 353. But, "on the termination of the war [the nation] has no longer any reason for
detaining them." Id. at 355.
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probably seemed like "catch and release.""°8 Other federal arguments
for the law coalesced following a key federal criminal case that
reached the Supreme Court while federal officials lobbied Congress.
D. Ex parte Crow Dog
As Indian agents continued, year after year, to lobby Congress,
they also sought such authority in the courts. Such an opportunity
arose in 1881 when Crow Dog, a Sioux Indian, killed Spotted Tail, a
Sioux Chief, within the Brule Sioux reservation."° When the crime
occurred, Indian agents pressed federal authorities to prosecute, even
while they apparently believed that they lacked clear authority.110
Though the underlying reason for the ill will between Crow Dog
and Spotted Tail remains contested to this day and may have been
political, economic, or even personal,"' Crow Dog never denied
108. See Harring, supra note 86, at 202-03, 223 (discussing how, after the murder of
Spotted Tail by Crow Dog, the Indian agent assigned to Crow Dog's Tribe-as well as
other Bureau of Indian Affairs officials-decided without real authority that Crow Dog
could be prosecuted under U.S. laws and proceeded to arrest other Indians, only stopping
reluctantly after being ordered by the Secretary of Interior to follow the precedent of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Ex parte Crow Dog that prohibited such actions).
109. Id. at 198-99.
110. Id. at 204.
111. A variety of narratives have been offered, few with citation to any original
sources. According to Professors Deloria and Lytle,
Spotted Tail had been a pliant and peaceful chief who acted as a buffer between
the United States and the more aggressive Sioux leaders, such as Red Cloud,
Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. He always counseled for peace and provided the
pro [federal] government faction within the tribe. Spotted Tail was amply
rewarded for his efforts on behalf of the government, receiving a nice two-story
house at the agency named after him on the Rosebud Creek .... But this
demonstration of favoritism greatly angered the traditional Sioux and, when
Spotted Tail extended his chiefly privileges to include the wives of some of the
traditional leaders, there was no question that he was a marked man even with the
aura of federal protection around him.
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 12, at 168; see also LEONARD CROW DOG & RICHARD
ERDOES, CROW DOG: FOUR GENERATIONS OF SIOUX MEDICINE MEN 32-35 (1995)
[hereinafter CROW DOG & ERDOES, CROW DOG] (suggesting that a simmering political
dispute between the government friendly Spotted Tail and the more traditional Crow Dog
erupted into a gunfight after Spotted Tail took the wife of Medicine Bear, who was a
crippled traditional elder and close friend of Crow Dog); MARY CROW DOG & RICHARD
ERDOES, LAKOTA WOMAN 10 (1990) (noting that Crow Dog "became famous for killing
a rival chief, the result of a feud over tribal politics"); VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED
FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 9 (1969) (characterizing the killing as an
"assassination"); GEORGE E. HYDE, SPOTTED TAIL'S FOLK: A HISTORY OF THE BRULE
SIoux 281-82 (1961) (noting that some of the accounts suggest that the dispute began
when Crow Dog tried to "shake down" white ranchers for money for grazing on tribal
land, only to learn that Spotted Tail had already taken their money and given the tribe's
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killing Spotted Tail and promptly owned up to the act.'1 2  A
customary tribal proceeding followed soon after the offense to
address the killing in traditional tribal fashion.11 3 As a result of the
tribal proceeding, Crow Dog and his family ultimately paid to Spotted
Tail's family what must have been a small fortune at the time: $600 in
cash, eight horses, and one blanket."4 Despite the fact that the tribe
had addressed the offense in its traditional manner,'15 and tribal "law
effectively and quickly redressed the killing and restored tribal
harmony, "116 federal officials began a prosecution of Crow Dog in
federal court.'17 Crow Dog was indicted and claimed that he acted in
self-defense."'
The motive for prosecuting Crow Dog became clear during the
ensuing jury trial. According to historical research by Professor
Sidney Harring, the United States Attorney argued to the jury that
Spotted Tail was a "friendly" Indian who had been made a tribal chief
by General Crook of the United States Army. 9 In contrast, Crow
Dog was portrayed "as a member of a faction favoring a continuation
of the wars."'120 If "hostile" Indians could kill "friendly" Indians with
impunity, the argument presumably went, it would be more difficult
to obtain cooperation. 2' Federal control would become more chaotic
and hostilities might resume. Thus, the argument contained a strong
undercurrent about the need for strong federal power over Indians.
Crow Dog was convicted and sentenced to hang. 22 Crow Dog sought
permission); WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW: THE
PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 170 (2d ed. 1995) ("Crow Dog
had killed Spotted Tail after the latter had appropriated the wife of a friend on the Sioux
reservation.").
112. See CROW DOG & ERDOES, CROW DOG, supra note 111, at 37.
113. See Harring, supra note 86, at 199.
114. See id. at 199 n.17. This account of the tribal proceeding is also set forth in the
August 9, 1881 edition of the Black Hills Daily Times.
115. While the tribe had resolved the matter through tribal custom, an Anglo-
American with a dualistic notion of criminal/civil justice might say that a civil claim had
been addressed but that criminal responsibility had not been determined in the property
settlement that was reached. While the tribe did have various kinds of punishments, it is
uncertain whether the tribal system divided civil and criminal wrongs in the highly
formalized artificial fashion that western justice systems have adopted.
116. Harring, supra note 86, at 199.
117. Id. at 204.
118. Id. at 208.
119. Id. at 207 (citing BLACK HILLS DAILY TIMES, Mar. 17, 1882).
120. Id.
121. Cf id. (noting how the prosecutor's opening statement portrayed Crow Dog as a
supporter of continued war and Spotted Tail as an enforcer of treaties).
122. Id. at 191.
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habeas relief, and his case eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court.2 3
In its ruling in Ex parte Crow Dog, the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction for lack of jurisdiction and ordered Crow Dog
released.124 In reaching its decision, the Court interpreted the Sioux
treaties and the Trade and Intercourse Acts as preserving to the
Indians the fundamental right of "self-government, the regulation by
themselves of their own domestic affairs, [and] the maintenance of
order and peace among their own members by the administration of
their own laws and customs.' 1 25  In an opinion that has since
represented a high point for the recognition of tribal self-government,
the Court reviewed federal criminal laws during the century prior to
the decision and indicated that crimes committed "by Indians against
each other were left to be dealt with by each tribe for itself, according
to its local customs. The policy of the government in that respect has
been uniform. 12
6
The immediate effect of the Court's ruling was to assure tribal
control over tribal criminal matters between Indians. The Court's
extravagant description of the case betrays arrogance, prejudice, and
yet even sympathy. It also reflects discomfort with the application of
federal norms to Indian people:
It is a case of life and death. It is a case where, against an
express exception in the law itself, that law, by argument and
inference only, is sought to be extended over aliens and
strangers; over the members of a community, separated by race,
by tradition, by the instincts of a free though savage life, from
the authority and power which seeks to impose upon them the
restraints of an external and unknown code, and to subject
them to the responsibilities of civil conduct, according to rules
and penalties of which they could have no previous warning;
which judges them by a standard made by others and not for
them, which takes no account of the conditions which should
except them from its exactions, and makes no allowance for
their inability to understand it. It tries them, not by their peers,
nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land,
but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a
social state of which they have an imperfect conception, and
123. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
124. Id. at 572.
125. Id. at 568.
126. Id. at 571-72.
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which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to the habits
of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature;
one which measures the red man's revenge by the maxims of
the white man's morality.127
The Supreme Court, however, also opened a door. In holding
that Congress had not explicitly abrogated existing federal treaties,
the Court invited Congress to enact law creating such jurisdiction. 28
E. Enactment of the Major Crimes Act
Armed with the defeat in the Supreme Court, federal Interior
Department officials promptly returned to Congress.29 In seeking a
law to allow them to punish "major crimes," federal officials claimed
that tribal laws were inadequate. 3 ° In a report to Congress in 1884,
the Secretary of the Interior cited Crow Dog in portraying Indian
country as a lawless place.13 ' The Secretary argued that if the courts
of the United States could not hear this murder case, then no court
could hear it, and that Indian custom was that the next of kin was
duty-bound to avenge the murder, a concept known as "blood
revenge.'32 The Secretary's argument was fictional on both counts:
the tribe addressed Crow Dog's actions swiftly in the traditional tribal
127. Id. at 571. In recognizing the importance of criminal laws in enforcing social
norms, the Court demonstrated an appreciation for ideas that would later be reflected in
Emile Durkheim's pathmarking work. See, e.g., DURKHEIM, supra note 18, at 80-82
(discussing how criminal acts are defined by the "common conscience").
128. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
129. Some controversy exists as to the immediate cause for passage of the Major
Crimes Act. Several accounts attribute enactment of the Act to public outrage following
the Supreme Court's decision. See, e.g., WASHBURN, supra note 111, at 170 (stating that
Congress viewed the Ex parte Crow Dog decision as "outrageous"); Clinton, Development,
supra note 28, at 963 (noting that the "decision aroused the ire of Congress, the
Department of the Interior, and the public," leading to a "groundswell of support"); Tim
Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendant's
Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 387, 390 (1974) (describing Congress's indignation
at the Crow Dog decision as quick). Professor Harring has challenged the popular
conception that Congress was motivated by popular outrage following the Crow Dog
decision. Harring, supra note 86, at 223. Harring finds little evidence of public attention
to the issue and notes that the Indian agents had sought legislation for more than ten
years. If anything, the Crow Dog decision should more probably be seen as a final blow
after a long campaign by the executive branch. The prosecution's theory of the case-that
a hostile Indian had killed a "friendly" one-and the fear of an uprising likely spurred
Congress to act. Id. at 223-27.
130. See Harring, supra note 86, at 224-25.
131. See id. at 225-26 (noting the lack of jurisdiction of state courts means that no
existing tribunal has the power to punish a murder committed within Indian territory).
132. See id. (quoting the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, supra note 95,
at 9).
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manner by requiring a substantial payment from the perpetrator's
family to the victim's family and, moreover, "blood revenge" was not
part of the Lower Brule tribe's customs.'33  The Secretary's
description of the practice of blood revenge loosely matched a
traditional Cherokee tribal practice that had long since been
abandoned in favor of a formal court system.3 Nevertheless, the
Secretary's argument effectively raised the specter of an unending
cycle of violence.1 35
Motivated by the Secretary's entreaties, Congress soon enacted
the Major Crimes Act. 36 The Act created federal jurisdiction over
seven serious crimes in Indian country: murder, manslaughter, rape,
assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. 137 In expressly
allowing the federal government to prosecute offenses between
Indians within Indian country, the Act constituted an avulsive change
in federal Indian policy.
Because the Major Crimes Act was enacted as a rider on the
annual appropriations legislation for the Department of the Interior,
direct legislative history is thin.138  However, three motives are
apparent. Likely the paramount motive was enlargement of federal
power over Indian tribes. 39 This justification is suggested within the
facts of Crow Dog,4 ° particularly if one accepts the narrative
presented by the federal prosecutor that Crow Dog was a hostile
traditional Indian who killed an Indian friendly to the federal
government.14'
The second key motive, apparent in the limited legislative history
and in the broader historical context, is assimilation. Extending
American laws over Indians was seen as a step toward assimilating
them, a policy that was gaining nationwide acceptance in the 1880s. 42
133. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
134. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM
CLAN TO COURT 52-65 (1975).
135. See Harring, supra note 86, at 199.
136. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1948)).
137. See id.
138. The sparse legislative record implies that Congressmen were primarily relying on
the statement of necessity by the Secretary of the Interior. See Harring, supra note 86, at
224. See generally 16 CONG. REC. 933, 935-36 (1885) (debating the Indian Appropriations
Bill, including the amendment adding the Major Crimes Act).
139. See Harring, supra note 86, at 224.
140. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
141. See supra note 111.
142. In the House floor debate on the Indian Appropriations Bill, one Member of
Congress indicated that he believed that the Indians "will be civilized a great deal sooner
[Vol. 84
2006] TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION
During those years, even Indian sympathizers believed that
assimilation was the only way for Indians to survive.'4 3 Federal
lawmakers expected that the application of federal criminal laws
would hasten assimilation. 1"
The Secretary's fanciful account of a never-ending cycle of
violence offers the third motivation: public safety on Indian
reservations. 145  Though this justification was based on false and
misleading information, it has proven the most durable.
The tone of the Crow Dog opinion and the arguments that the
Secretary made to Congress present an irony that is striking today.
The "savages" addressed Crow Dog's offense using a traditional
approach to criminal justice that today would be characterized as
restorative justice. 46 The "civilized" federal approach involved an
adversarial trial followed by a public execution by hanging.
by being put under such laws and taught to regard life and the personal property of
others." 16 CONG. REC. 933, 936 (1885).
143. Harring notes that even the presumably reform-minded members of the Indian
Rights Association, a Philadelphia-based group that lobbied against the paternalistic
policies of the federal government, were strongly advocating in favor of assimilation of
Indian people. SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
134 (1994); see also 2 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 676-80 (discussing the formation and
intentions of the Indian Rights Act). A key component of assimilation was allotment of
Indian lands. The goal was to force Indians to leave their collective land holdings and
communal existence and to become "small-time capitalists with individual stakes in the
American system." Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and
Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38
TULSA L. REV. 5, 6 (2002). Under the federal allotment laws, the federal government
unilaterally divided tribal land into parcels and distributed each parcel to individual tribal
members, allowing "surplus" lands to be settled by non-Indians. See, e.g., General
Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 2000). See
generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995)
(providing a broad analysis of the history and effects of the allotment era).
144. In debate on the Major Crimes Act, one member of Congress repeatedly cited the
Secretary of the Interior's arguments that such a law was needed for the "civilization of
the Indian tribes." 16 CONG. REC. 934 (1885).
145. See supra note 129.
146. See generally Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural
Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205,206 (defining restorative justice
as allowing "distinct voices to contribute to an appropriate outcome without necessarily
assenting to the same theory" and therefore "better serv[ing] the diversity of perspectives
on criminal sanctioning than the general application of any one substantive theory of
punishment").
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E Kagama: A Challenge to the Constitutionality of the Major
Crimes Act
Soon after enactment, the Major Crimes Act was used in a
murder prosecution involving a member of the Hoopa tribe in
northern California. In United States v. Kagama,47 which reached the
Supreme Court in 1886, the defendant challenged the Act's
constitutionality, arguing that Congress lacked authority to extend its
laws over Indians unilaterally.1 48 The opinion has produced a good
deal of scholarly consternation.149
The federal government based its defense of congressional
authority in the Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause. 5 ° The
Court, however, was not convinced. The Court found that grounding
this congressional power in the Indian Commerce Clause would
constitute a "very strained construction" of that clause.' It found
the Constitution "almost silent" as to the issue of congressional
authority,152 and, after considering several other likely candidates for
such authority within the text of the Constitution, the Court
147. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
148. Id. at 376.
149. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship:
The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 542-43 (1996) (noting that the Supreme
Court has moved away from the suggestion of extra constitutional powers and has since
grounded Congress's power over Indians in the Indian Commerce Clause); Robert N.
Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1176-77 (1995)
(considering Kagama's place in the context of Indian law constitutionality); Clinton, supra
note 59, at 172 (stating that Kagama was a "tour de force in judicial constitutional
creativity and marked a major departure from established norms of constitutional
interpretation"); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
31, 35 (1996) (describing its theoretical justification as "an embarrassment of
constitutional theory" and its holding as "an embarrassment of humanity"); L. Scott
Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sovereignty and the
Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 95 n.82 (1994) ("The Kagama Court, for example,
considered and rejected the Indian Commerce Clause when deciding that Congress had
power to impose the Major Crimes Act on tribes. Instead, it invented the plenary power
doctrine with near-explicit recognition that the doctrine is extraconstitutional."); Richard
A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United
States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L.
REV. 617, 664-65 (1994) (considering Kagama's constitutional grounding in the Indian
Commerce Clause); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope,
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 237-39 (1984) (detailing Professor Clinton's
thoughts on sources of federal power over Indians); Comment, Federal Plenary Power in
Indian Affairs After Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 246-48 (1982)
(characterizing the Kagama Court's creation of an extraconstitutional power over Indians
as the "it-must-be-somewhere" doctrine).
150. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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concluded it was "not able to see in ... the Constitution and its
amendments any delegation of power to enact a code of criminal law
for the punishment of [major crimes between Indians]."'53
But then the Court took a startling turn. It upheld the Major
Crimes Act, not on the basis of any explicit constitutional authority,
but on the theory that Congress's authority to enact such a law must
exist by virtue of the federal government's geographic dominion over
the United States and the federal responsibility in light of the
dependent status of tribes.154 In other words, contrary to the well-
known doctrine of enumerated powers,155 the Court held that the
power to enact the Major Crimes Act was extraconstitutional yet
entirely legitimate,156 justifying this power using a theory that one
commentator has denominated the "'it-must-be-somewhere'
doctrine."'57
In cases since Kagama, Congress's power to enact the Major
Crimes Act has never been seriously challenged.158 In more recent
153. Id. at 379.
154. See id. at 379-85. This notion of responsibility was borrowed from an early John
Marshall Indian law opinion, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 516 (1832). See
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382.
155. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-25 (1819) (holding
that the establishment of a national bank does not exceed congressional authority). In this
respect, Kagama is difficult to square with modern decisions. See, e.g., United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-27 (2000) (holding that a federal civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress's authority under both the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-68
(1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded the scope of
Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
156. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 131. Professor Philip Frickey has argued that congressional
power over Indian affairs can be viewed in a manner more consistent with prevailing
constitutional norms if one employs a more structural approach to the Constitution and
views international relations and colonization as important backdrops to the
interpretation. Frickey, supra note 149, at 67-70. Under this view, the congressional
power discussed in Kagama was an exercise, in essence, of the inherent power to control
aliens on American soil, including Indians who were already in this country before the
country was founded but were strangers to the state and federal polities. Professor
Frickey's argument is somewhat more nuanced than the Court's was in Kagama and
certainly more coherent. For evaluations of Professor Frickey's approach, see Saikrishna
Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1104-05 (2004); Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39 TULSA L.
REV. 247, 252 (2003); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201-02 (2004)
(seemingly adopting Professor Frickey's approach).
157. Comment, supra note 149, at 247.
158. Cf Lara, 541 U.S. at 196 (holding that Congress does have the power to relax
restrictions on the inherent legal authority of tribes). But see Warren Stapleton, Note,
Indian Country, Federal Justice: Is the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Major
Crimes Act Constitutional?, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 338 (1997) (arguing that the Major
Crimes Act lacks any legitimate basis, constitutional or extraconstitutional).
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cases, the Supreme Court has back-pedaled on the notion that this
power is extraconstitutional, 59 but it has never repudiated the broad
conception of federal authority over Indians that serves as the
foundation of the Major Crimes Act. 6°
The Kagama opinion is useful for identifying two points relevant
for further discussion of public safety and criminal justice in Indian
country. First, as part of the justification for congressional power, the
Court recognized that the United States has a "duty of protection"
toward the Indians, and from this duty arises "the power" to exercise
criminal jurisdiction.16' This theory, that power arises by necessity
from federal responsibility, is the inverse of the more common
aphorism, "with power comes responsibility."
Second, the responsibility is peculiarly federal. According to the
Court, tribes "owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them
no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States
where they are found are often their deadliest enemies."' 62  As a
result, the power recognized in Kagama. is a clear manifestation of
federalism.
As the Court's opinions in Crow Dog and Kagama recognize, at
the time of the enactment of the Major Crimes Act, Indians were not
yet citizens of the United States. 63 The law constitutes an extension
159. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 652-53 (1978) (implicitly characterizing
the Major Crimes Act as "federal supervision [of Indians] under the Commerce Clause");
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) ("The source of
federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now
generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating
commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making."); cf. United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 648 (1977) (citing Kagama for the proposition that "Congress has undoubted
constitutional power to prescribe a criminal code applicable in Indian country").
160. In numerous cases, the Court has quoted with approval much of the broad
language in Kagama describing federal power. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364
(2001); Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-57 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23
(1978); see also Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (doubting that
the Indian Commerce Clause confers on Congress plenary power over Indian affairs and
noting that this doctrine should be revisited).
161. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 378; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1883). Indians were not
made citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884); see
also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1,
56-58 (2002) (discussing Elk v. Williams and the legal basis for asserting that Indians were
not American citizens). Citizenship was not conferred on all Indians until the General (or
Indian) Citizenship Act of 1924. See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh
and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American
Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETFER L.J. 107, 179-80 (1999).
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of federal authority over non-citizens lawfully residing on their lands.
Because the extension of authority was not through bilateral treaties
with individual tribes, but a general (and unilateral) federal law, the
Major Crimes Act lacked any claim of actual or democratic
consent.' 64 It was an extension of authority over a subjugated people
at the time of their greatest weakness and political dependence on the
United States. In other words, it was a simple and straightforward act
of colonization.
III. HISTORY OF THE MAJOR CRIMES ACT SINCE ENACTMENT AND
IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF INDIAN POLICY
The Major Crimes Act is best understood in the context of
general federal Indian policy. It was enacted during the Assimilation
Era,65 but federal policies have shifted dramatically and repeatedly in
the ensuing 120 years.
A. Allotment, Assimilation, and the Major Crimes Act
Just after the Major Crimes Act, Congress enacted the General
Allotment Act, 66  another key law directed toward Indian
assimilation. The stated goal of allotment was the assimilation of
Indians through their transformation into individual farmers and
ranchers.167 The allotment policies broke up large tribal communal
landholdings and converted the lands into numerous individual
agricultural or grazing parcels that were distributed to individual
Indians and families. 161 Surplus lands were sold to settlers. 169 The
allotment policy was pursued with vigor through the early 1900s. 7°
And the sale of surplus lands was not the only source of loss of Indian
lands. Once federal restrictions on Indian lands disappeared, many
Indians lost their individual allotment lands.' As a result, the tribal
164. For irony, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197-212 (1978),
and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684-98 (1990), in which the Supreme Court denied tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and nonmembers respectively, at least partially on
the theory that it would be improper to subject citizens to the criminal authority of
governments in which they lack any right of political participation or theoretical
democratic consent.
165. See supra Part II.E.
166. General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(repealed 2000).
167. Id. § 1, 24 Stat. at 388.
168. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
169. Id.
170. Judith Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1995).
171. FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 137-
38 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982).
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land base in the United States shrank from approximately 138 million
acres in 1887 to approximately 48 million acres in 1934.172
During the Allotment Era, the reach of the Major Crimes Act to
individuals decreased as Indian lands were parceled out and
reservations were disestablished. Allotted lands that passed out of
Indian hands were no longer subject to federal criminal jurisdiction. 73
However, in keeping with the assimilationist motives, the scope of the
Act's subject matter gradually increased. Although it originally
enumerated seven major offenses, it was expanded in 1909 when
Congress added an additional offense, assault with a dangerous
weapon, 17" bringing the apparent number of major crimes to eight. In
1932, Congress added incest and robbery to the enumerated offenses,
raising the number of offenses to ten. 75
B. The Indian New Deal and a Subtle Shift in the Purpose of the
Major Crimes Act
By the mid-1930s, the assimilation approach was having
disastrous effects on Indians, causing federal policymakers to doubt
its efficacy; allotment had been effective primarily in stripping Indian
tribes, and eventually individual Indians, of their lands and leaving
Indians in a state of poverty.176 In light of this unfortunate outcome
and the severe depression that held America in its grips, the notion
that Indians should work to assimilate and become like other
Americans must have been less than compelling, both to Americans
and to Indian themselves. At the same time, Roosevelt's New Deal
reflected a renewed faith in government. Federal policymakers
officially extended this faith in government to tribal governments,
which federal policymakers began to see as viable entities for serving
impoverished Indian peoples, with proper assistance from the federal
government. 77  Thus, allotment and, to a lesser extent, its
assimilationist intent, were rejected. A new law, the Indian
172. Id.
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) (defining Indian country as inclusive of only those
allotments that are still owned by Indians).
174. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350, § 321, 35 Stat. 1151 (1909); see also Jo-
Nell Silvestro, Note, The Indian Crimes Act of 1976: Another Amendment to the Major
Crimes Act-But How Many More To Come?, 22 S.D. L. REV. 407, 408-10 (1977)
(discussing the history of amendments to the Major Crimes Act).
175. Act of June 28, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-199, ch. 284, 47 Stat. 336, 337 (1932).
176. See 2 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 895 (concluding that the allotment policy "failed
miserably").
177. See generally id. at 917-1012 (discussing the "Indian New Deal").
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Reorganization Act,178  was enacted to help revitalize tribal
governments. '79 This law assisted tribal governments in developing
constitutions and economic development structures.180
In seeking to revitalize tribal governments, one approach might
have involved the repeal of the Major Crimes Act and restoration of
tribal preeminence in criminal justice matters on Indian reservations.
However, the Major Crimes Act was not revisited during the New
Deal Era. It is doubtful that relinquishment of federal criminal
jurisdiction seemed viable to federal officials who viewed tribes as
broken, dependent, as poor as ever, and still in need of tremendous
federal assistance. Thus, although the United States continued to
exercise jurisdiction over serious crimes between Indians, beliefs
about the continuing purpose for the federal role in Indian country
prosecutions likely began to shift. One positive outcome of Indian
Reorganization was the strengthening of tribal institutions and
ultimately tribal courts.18 ' Still, federal officials likely developed a
view of criminal justice as a federal responsibility, as expressed in
Kagama, and a useful form of federal assistance to tribes.
It was not long, however, before federal policy turned away from
the Indian New Deal and Reorganization and shifted back toward an
assimilationist approach.
C. Termination and the Threatened Obsolescence of the Indian
Country Regime
In a time now known as the "Termination Era" for the numerous
laws enacted by Congress seeking to terminate the federal
government's unique relationship with particular Indian tribes, the
United States turned in the late 1940s and through the 1950s toward a
policy of destroying tribal existence and assimilating Indians. The
United States was brimming with post-war confidence, and it was
perhaps unimaginable to many Americans that Indians living within
the borders of this country would wish to maintain separate and
independent tribal identities. 82
178. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000)).
179. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 919.
180. 25 U.S.C. § 470 (2000) (economic development); id. § 476 (constitutions).
181. HAGAN, supra note 85, at 150-52.
182. See generally DONALD L. FIxICO, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL
INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960 (1986) (discussing the federal policies of the Termination
Era). To some degree, assimilationist policies in the United States during the twentieth
century seem to run with American national confidence. Thus, during the Great
Depression, when confidence in America and its ideals was low, policymakers rejected the
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In the late 1940s, ,Congress created the Indian Claims
Commission, an entity designed primarily to address the long
festering claims that Indian tribes had against the United States.183
The Indian Claims Commission Act was in some ways a prelude to
termination of tribal governments."8 Some thought that the bitter
feelings held by many Indians were the principal obstacle to
successful assimilation of Indians.'85 The theory was that if the
United States addressed these historical wrongs, perhaps Indians
would let go of the bitterness that helped bind them to tribal
communities and against the United States. The Indian Claims
Commission awards also facilitated termination in that eighty percent
of each judgment awarded by the Commission was generally paid not
to tribes as tribes but in per capita shares to individual tribal members
in order to place the individual Indian in a firmer financial position
vis-A-vis the community. 186  In other words, tribal communal assets
(legal claims against the government) were converted to individual
property, in a fashion not unlike allotment.
In the 1950s, Congress enacted statutes terminating its
relationship with various individual Indian tribes.187 When Congress
"terminated" the federal relationship with a tribe, the federal
government lost federal criminal authority, and jurisdiction over the
affected Indian people devolved to states. Thus, the termination acts
had the practical effect of diminishing the reach of federal criminal
assimilation policy. See supra Part III.B. In the aftermath of World War II, when
American confidence and optimism were unbridled, American policymakers returned to
assimilation. In the 1960s, when American confidence waned, policymakers again began
to reject assimilationist tendencies. See infra Part III.D.
183. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations & Restitution: Indian
Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REv. 453, 468 (1994).
184. See H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION 166 (1990) (noting that the termination movement "became linked
with the movement for the Indian Claims Commission").
185. Id. at vii, 170.
186. See 25 U.S.C. § 1403 (2000).
187. For a summary of termination laws, including a table of terminated tribes, see 2
PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 1046-59; see also Act of Sept. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-629, 76
Stat. 429 (terminating the Ponca); Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-322, 73 Stat. 592
(terminating the Catawba); Act of Aug. 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-943, 70 Stat. 963
(terminating the Ottawa); Act of Aug. 2, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-921, 70 Stat. 937
(terminating the Peoria); Act of Sept. 1, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-762, 68 Stat. 1099
(terminating various tribes in Utah); Act of Aug. 27, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-671, 68 Stat. 868
(terminating the Ute); Act of Aug. 23, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-627, 68 Stat. 768 (terminating
the Alabama and Coushatta); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-588, 68 Stat. 724
(terminating various tribes in western Oregon); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-587,
68 Stat. 718 (terminating the Klamath); Act of June 17, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-399, 68 Stat.
250 (terminating the Menominee).
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jurisdiction over Indians in the same way that the allotment policies
did. Tribal lands that had theretofore been considered federal
"Indian country" became ordinary private property subject to state
jurisdiction; members of the terminated tribe lost their unique federal
and tribal legal status and simply became ordinary state citizens.188
Aside from the termination acts, the hallmark of the Termination
Era was Public Law 280.189 Enacted in 1953, Public Law 280 radically
changed the criminal justice system in certain parts of Indian country.
Having heard repeated criticism of federal officials for high crime
rates on Indian reservations, Congress decided to withdraw federal
criminal jurisdiction in certain states and transfer jurisdiction to state
governments. 9° As a result, Public Law 280 law further decreased the
geographic reach of federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.191
Moreover, it gave states more authority than the federal government
had exercised. Under Public Law 280, states may enforce virtually all
of their criminal laws, including misdemeanors.1" Thus, Public Law
280 was an even more aggressive encroachment on tribal sovereignty
than was the existing federal system.
Following the enactment of Public Law 280, the federal
government no longer possessed jurisdiction to prosecute major
crimes in Indian country in California or in significant portions of
Alaska, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington, and parts of some
other states.1 93 Professor Carole Goldberg, the leading expert on
Public Law 280, estimates that, in real terms, Public Law 280
diminished the reach of federal jurisdiction by reducing by one-
188. See 2 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 1048-49.
189. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 82 Stat. 78 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, and 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
190. See CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL
SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and
the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian County, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1415-19
(1997) (discussing the effects of Public Law 280); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280:
The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 541
(1975) (noting that federal law enforcement was "neither well-financed nor vigorous" and
citing congressional materials).
191. Several other federal statutes have had some of the same effect as Public Law 280
but have been limited to specific states or specific reservations. For example, in 1948,
Congress conferred on the state of New York criminal jurisdiction over offenses by or
against Indians on Indian reservations within that state. 25 U.S.C. § 232 (originally
enacted as Act of July 2, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-881, ch. 804, 62 Stat. 1224). Congress
enacted similar acts that covered portions or all of other states, including Kansas, North
Dakota, and Iowa. See COHEN, supra note 171, at 372-76.
192. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 190, at 1415-17.
193. Several states have "retroceded" portions of their Public Law 280 jurisdiction
back to tribes and the federal government. See 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (authorizing the
United States to accept retrocession of criminal and/or civil jurisdiction from states).
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quarter to one-half both the geographic reach of federal jurisdiction
and the number of people subject to federal jurisdiction.194 Though
Public Law 280 diminished the federal law enforcement role in
certain parts of the United States, the federal Indian country criminal
justice regime prevails in Arizona, Idaho, Michigan, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, North and South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming,
as well as certain Indian lands in Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
Although Public Law 280 has not been repealed, optional
expansions of state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country were halted
by a later amendment requiring tribal consent for any increase in
Public Law 280 authority over Indian reservations, 9 ' and tribes
maintain vigilant opposition to any new assumption of state criminal
jurisdiction on Indian lands.196 As a reform of the Indian country
criminal justice scheme, Public Law 280 has suffered blistering
criticism for undermining tribal justice systems. 9 7  It has had a
tremendous impact on criminal justice issues for Indian tribes,
changing the debate from whether the federal government or tribes
should possess primary jurisdiction over serious Indian offenses to
whether the federal government or states should possess primary
jurisdiction over these offenses.
When the Termination Era began, the federal government had
pervasive control on Indian reservations: the Bureau of Indian
Affairs controlled tribal forestry and agriculture, real property leasing
and management, law enforcement, education, social services, and
numerous other functions and services that are normally handled by
local or state governments outside Indian country.198 Likewise, the
194. DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC
LAW (forthcoming 2006).
195. See 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a).
196. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 190, at 1408 (noting that no tribes have
voluntarily consented to state jurisdiction since 1968, when the tribal consent provision
was added to Public Law 280).
197. In transferring criminal jurisdiction to states, the United States displaced existing
tribal systems by cutting off federal support that might otherwise have been offered.
GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 190, at 8-10. Thus, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose
argues that enactment of Public Law 280 created lawlessness on Indian reservations:
though tribal systems are now neglected, the states are no more aggressive than the
federal government in enforcing laws there. Id. At the same time, Goldberg-Ambrose
asserts that the law has given states a power over Indian tribes that is used for illegitimate
purposes. Id. Public Law 280 thus presents the same "agency problems" that federal
Indian country authority presents: criminal justice is handled not by tribal governments
but by state and federal "agents" with their own independent motives.
198. See generally ALAN L. SORKIN, STUDIES IN SOCIAL ECONOMICS: AMERICAN
INDIANS AND FEDERAL AID (1971) (describing and evaluating the strengths and
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Indian Health Service handled Indian hospitals and healthcare. 199 As
the federal government gradually withdrew financial support and
terminated its relationship with specific tribes, Indians no longer had
the federal government or the tribal governments to rely on.
Providing education and other services to impoverished American
Indians suddenly became the responsibility of state governments.2 °
Cash-strapped states that initially favored increased state authority in
Indian country began to see Public Law 280 and the termination acts
as unfunded mandates. 20 ' As a result, Indian people were poorly
served, and civil rights issues flared.
Due largely to the persistence of Indians and Indian tribes in
resisting termination, Congress eventually changed course. The
termination policies were rejected, just as the allotment policies had
been rejected thirty years earlier.2 2 In recent decades, the legislative
agenda of the Termination Era has largely been reversed. Some of
the tribes that were "terminated" were later restored to federal
recognition through legislation 213 or litigation.21 After restoration,
however, most of these restored tribes were subject to state criminal
jurisdiction under Public Law 280, so state authority remains intact
and federal criminal authority remains diminished. Aside from
markedly decreasing the geographic reach of federal Indian country
authority through termination acts and Public Law 280, however, the
Termination Era occasioned no change in the Major Crimes Act.
D. The Era of Self-Determination and Self-Governance
The refusal of terminated Indian tribes to go quietly into the
night was a powerful symbol of Indian resistance and resilience.
Indian activists organized around this issue and others to try to forge
weaknesses of the Bureau of Indian Affairs programs that administered health,
agricultural, and industrial development, property and income management, Indian
education, and welfare services).
199. Id. at 51-65.
200. See DEBO, supra note 81, at 378.
201. See Goldberg, supra note 190, at 551-58 (discussing the controversy over financing
state jurisdiction).
202. See supra Part III.B.
203. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (2000) (restoring the Menominee); id. §§ 566-
566(h) (restoring the Klamath).
204. Numerous California rancherias were restored through the decision in the Tillie
Hardwick litigation. See Hardwick v. United States, No. 79-1710 SW, 1994 WL 721578 at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1994) (discussing the Tillie Hardwick decision and denying a motion
to re-open the Hardwick case). Tillie Hardwick itself was resolved by settlement in which
the federal government stipulated that certain California Indian rancherias had never
been effectively terminated and the district court accepted that stipulation in an
unpublished decision. See id.
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a new federal Indian policy. Indian people took several highly visible
stands for their rights including the occupation of Alcatraz in
November 1969, the occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
headquarters in Washington, D.C. in 1972, and the occupation of the
Sioux village of Wounded Knee in 1973.205 To be sure, not all of the
actions by Indian civil rights advocates sought to increase tribal
governmental authority. Some activists viewed tribal governments as
just another potential source of government oppression. °6 However,
their highly visible activities drew broad attention to Indian issues.
As a result, among the developments that occurred at the close
of the Termination Era and at the beginning of a new policy era was a
law that gave voice to concerns of civil rights advocates. In 1968,
Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act,2 °7 which recognized
tribal criminal jurisdiction, but substantially limited it by requiring
tribal governments to provide their citizens most of the protections
that the federal government provides through the Bill of Rights and
that states also must provide through incorporation of many of those
provisions in the Fourteenth Amendment.2 8  In addition to
prohibiting tribal governments from interfering with the freedoms of
speech, assembly and free exercise of religion set forth in the First
Amendment,2 9 the Indian Civil Rights Act incorporated most of the
criminal procedure protections found elsewhere in the Bill of Rights,
such as the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements and the
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures;21 the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy,211 compelled self
incrimination,212 and deprivation of life, liberty or property without
205. See 2 PRUCHA, supra note 9, at 1115-20 (discussing some of the stands taken by
Indian people in the 1960s and 1970s). For a colorful account of the occupation of
Alcatraz, see HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 517-19
(1980).
206. A significant source of litigation against tribal governments has, since at least the
1960s, been tribal members themselves who are affected by tribal governmental actions.
Cf Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21 VT.
L. REV. 7,21-23 (1996) (discussing civil rights litigation in tribal courts).
207. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1303).
208. Tribes have not necessarily interpreted these protections identically with
interpretations by state and federal courts. See Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and
Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 906-08 (2003) (discussing legislative attempts
to alter the Indian Civil Rights Act and the subsequent effect of those attempts on tribal
sovereignty).
209. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1).
210. See id. § 1302(2).
211. See id. § 1302(3).
212. See id. § 1302(4).
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due process;213 the Sixth Amendment's rights to notice, a speedy and
public trial, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process, and
counsel;214 the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions on excessive bail,
excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment;215 and even the
Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of equal protection.216
To enforce these new rules, Congress provided the same remedy
for deprivations of liberty by tribal courts and tribal governments that
is available for such deprivations by states-that is, a petition in
federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.217 In applying these rules to
tribal governments, the Indian Civil Rights Act rejected termination
and endorsed the continued existence of tribal governments. But it
did so at great cost to tribal sovereignty: in many respects, these rules
imposed uniformity by requiring tribal governments to look and act
like other American governments.
In 1970, President Richard Nixon called for "tribal self-
determination," a concept which he understood would give tribal
governments an increased role in implementing federal Indian
programs.218  The first major law to implement the new "self-
determination" policy was the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975.219 Under this law, also known as
Public Law 93-638, Indian tribes could contract with the Bureau of
Indian Affairs ("BIA") for federal funding to provide certain specific
services, such as education.22° Under such contracts, known as "638
contracts," tribes negotiate with the BIA to perform the BIA's
functions, using the BIA's funding.221 The contracting of federal
213. See id. § 1302(8).
214. See id. § 1302(6).
215. See id. § 1302(7).
216. See id. § 1302(8).
217. See id. § 1303; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62-70 (1978) (holding
that habeas relief is the only relief authorized by Congress); see also Poodry v. Tonawanda
Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 879-80 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that federal habeas
review extends beyond mere imprisonment to the tribal punishment of banishment from
reservation).
218. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564-76 (July 8,
1970).
219. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 to 458bbb-2 (2000).
220. See id. § 450f.
221. See id. § 450(/); 25 C.F.R. § 273 (2005). Neither BIA officials nor the tribes were
fully happy with practical implementation of the 638 contract program. In fact, the regime
was hampered by the Byzantine bureaucracy of the BIA, which compartmentalized
functions in a manner that frustrated flexibility among those providing services. Because
tribes appreciated the general approach, however, there were significant efforts to expand
and improve the system. See Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for
Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1264-66
(1995).
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functions on Indian reservations by Indian tribes was widely hailed as
an improvement in federal Indian policy and a meaningful step
toward self-determination.222 While it did not eliminate federal
oversight, it improved the delivery of federal services to tribes.223
Law enforcement issues were key in ushering in the Self-
Determination Era.224 Indian tribes and others had long complained
about the quality of federal law enforcement and criminal justice on
Indian lands.225 To provide one compelling example of such criticism,
the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community near Phoenix
suffered more than twenty unsolved homicides in the 1970s.226 Tribes
thus agitated for and received law enforcement authority under 638
contracts. According to a tribal official from Salt River, after the
222. See S. Bobo Dean & Joseph H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the
Federal Policy of Indian Tribal Self-Determination, 36 TULSA L.J. 349, 350 (2000) (quoting
a Miccosukee tribal leader describing the self-determination policy "as the most successful
Indian policy [ever] adopted by the United States" (alteration in original)).
223. Id.
224. In New York, members of the Oneida tribe refused to allow state police onto
reservation land, sparking an armed standoff that lasted for days. Ray Halbritter &
Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or Dependence? The Practical Value and Meaning of
Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 531, 559-60 (1994).
225. See GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 190, at 162 ("In practical application,
federal law enforcement agents, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
U.S. Attorney's Office, have demonstrated a history of declining to investigate or
prosecute violations of the Major Crimes Act."); Echohawk, supra note 35, at 99-100
("U.S. Attorneys often decline to prosecute Major Crimes Act cases on the reservation
because of a mixture of factual, legal, practical, or logistical problems."); B.J. Jones,
Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judiciary Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and
Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 513 (1998) ("Federal
prosecutors, busy with prosecuting a variety of more serious crimes, perhaps have been
remiss in devoting the necessary attention to the problems that arise when non-Indians
commit offenses in Indian country .... ); Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No
Man's Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 963 (2002) (stating that "U.S. Attorneys, unlike state
prosecutors, typically decline to prosecute in a far greater percentage of cases result[ing] in
the underenforcement of criminal laws in Indian country"); Larry Cunningham, Note,
Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: Protecting Indian Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2187, 2188 (2000) (noting that "many United States Attorneys have abdicated their
responsibility to prosecute crimes in Indian country committed by non-Indians"); Amy
Radon, Note, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian
Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1278 (2004) ("Because
federal prosecutors decline to prosecute [domestic violence] crimes, the law provides no
deterrent effect .... "); cf. Laurence Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Country in
Arizona, 1 ARIZ. L. REV. 62, 72-73 (1959) (noting reluctance of federal prosecutors and
federal courts to handle petty offenses over which they have jurisdiction in Indian country,
with the result that "petty frauds and simple assaults" by non-Indians against Indians
"which are fairly numerous-usually escape prosecution entirely").
226. Gary Tahmahkera, Chief of Police at the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community, Discussion with U.S. Dep't of Just. and the Nat'l Congress of Am. Indians in
Washington D.C. (Mar. 18, 2004) (notes on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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tribal government entered a 638 contract for law enforcement services
and began investigating its own offenses, the tribal police solved each
of the ensuing homicides, and unsolved cases have not been a serious
problem on the reservation since that time.227
Having established that tribal administration of Indian programs
was workable, self-determination was broadened dramatically in 1988
and recast as "self-governance. 2 28  Rather than negotiating for
individual functions, the new law allowed tribes to negotiate broad
"compacts" with the Department of the Interior that covered virtually
all of the federal services on a reservation. Instead of discreet
contracts for individual programs, tribes with self-governance
compacts received large block grants and obtained broad discretion
over allocation of those resources, giving tribes the ability to
prioritize the services they found important.2 9 With these laws,
federal Indian policy evolved toward the preservation and
reinvigoration of tribal governments.
23 °
E. Federal Indian Policy Today
Today, the federal government expressly recognizes Indian tribes
as sovereign nations with whom the United States has a government-
to-government relationship. 231' Rather than seeking to destroy tribal
227. Id.
228. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat.
2285, 2296 (1988); see also John Tahsuda, Economic Self-Determination: Federal Policies
Promoting Development of Reservation Economies, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 559, 561 (2002)
(discussing self-governance as a refinement of self-deterministic policies).
229. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 221, at 1267-68.
230. See, e.g., Nixon, supra note 11, at 256-58 (recognizing "a new era [of self-
determination] in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian
decisions"); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (signed into law by President Ford); George H.W. Bush,
Statement on Indian Policy, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra
note 11, at 335-36 (same); William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to Native American and
Alaska Native Tribal Leaders, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra
note 11, at 343-45 (same); Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 14 (same);
William Jefferson Clinton, Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra
note 11, at 343-46 (same); Ronald Reagan, Statement by the President: Indian Policy, in
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 11, at 301-02 (pledging a
commitment to tribal self-government).
231. See, e.g., Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. II, 108 Stat.
4250 (1994) (recognizing a right to self-government arising from the inherent sovereignty
of tribes and calling for government-to-government relations with tribal governments);
Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 14 ("My Administration is committed to
continuing to work with federally recognized tribal governments on a government-to-
government basis ...."); William Jefferson Clinton, Government-to-Government
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governments or assimilate individual Indians, the United States now
repeatedly expresses support for tribal "self-determination" and
"self-governance. "232
These policies now enjoy overwhelming support among federal
policymakers 233 and among Indian tribes. Under the federal policies
of self-determination and self-governance, the tribal role in
implementing governmental responsibilities has broadened beyond
the programs of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to those of the Indian
Health Service.234 In recent years, nearly half of the budgets of both
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service have been
distributed directly to tribes under self-determination or self-
governance programs.235 Congress has also promoted the ideal of
tribal self-governance in a variety of other Indian programs.236
At the same time, Congress has aggressively pursued tribal self-
governance initiatives in general governmental programs, with the
result that tribal self-governance has been "mainstreamed," even
outside traditional "Indian programs." Nearly all of the major federal
environmental laws enacted by Congress and administered by the
Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1994)
(advocating government-to-government relationships with Indian tribes).
232. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-638, § 1017, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450a (2000))
(authorizing contracts and grants for tribes to provide various federal services); Nixon,
supra note 11, at 258 ("Federal government needs Indian energies and Indian leadership if
its assistance is to be effective ....").
233. See Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 14 ("My Administration is
committed to continuing to work with federally recognized tribal governments on a
government-to-government basis and strongly supports and respects tribal sovereignty and
self-determination for tribal governments in the United States."); see also Press Release,
Senator John McCain, McCain, Daschle and Johnson Introduce "Discussion" Bill to
Advance Tribal Participation in Reform of Indian Trust Funds and Assets (Apr. 19, 2002)
(self-determination is a "bedrock principle[]" of federal policy), available at http://mccain.
senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Contentid=634.
234. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 221, at 1268. In 1991, seven tribes entered
self-governance compacts that constituted around $27 million of federal appropriations
shifted to the tribes through funding agreements. It has since grown to involve more than
226 tribes in more than eighty-five funding agreements. Henry M. Buffalo, Jr.,
Implementing Self Determination and Self Governance, in FED. BAR ASs'N, TRIBAL SELF-
DETERMINATION AND THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY: COLLABORATION OR
CONFLIcr 173, 174 (2003) (materials of the 28th Indian Law Conference).
235. See Dean & Webster, supra note 222, at 349-50.
236. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000) (stating that
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act is concerned with "promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency and strong tribal governments"); see also Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (regarding tribes' jurisdiction over child
custody issues); Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of
1996, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4243 (allowing tribal agencies to run federal public housing
programs).
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Environmental Protection Agency have been amended to create a
distinct governmental role for Indian tribes.2 7  Likewise, Congress
has amended key public lands and natural resource laws to promote
self-governance values.238 In some of these programs, the self-
governance reforms represent attempts to develop "capacity" among
Indian tribal governments, implying that tribal governments currently
lack a full responsibility, but will earn greater authority and
responsibility when the capacity grows.239 In others, adequate tribal
authority allows tribes to function as sovereign decisionmakers with
little or no oversight.240
With tribal self-governance, the federal government has moved
away from unilateral federal action on Indian reservations toward a
policy favoring a government-to-government relationship with Indian
237. Several of these, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe
Drinking Water Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (also known as "CERCLA" or the "Superfund" law), treat tribal
governments in a manner similar to state governments for key purposes. See Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000) (stating that "Indian tribes shall be treated as States");
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b)(1) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7601(d)(2)(1) (stating that the "Administrator is authorized to treat Indian tribes as
States"); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (stating that "[t]he governing body of an Indian tribe
shall be afforded substantially the same treatment as a state"). Likewise, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") recognizes tribes in the same category as
municipal governments. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13)
(including Indian tribes in the definition of "municipality"). Executive department actions
have proceeded apace with congressional actions. See, e.g., Sandra Zellmer, Tribal People
and Environmentalists: Friends or Foes?, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 9, 12-13
(2002) (describing Interior/Commerce Secretarial Order 3206, American Indian Tribal
Rights, Federal Tribal Trust Responsibility and the Endangered Species Act (June 5,
1997), that directed the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration to be sensitive to tribal interests in implementing the
Endangered Species Act); see also Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitat for
Indian Nations and Endangered Species, 43 S.D. L. REV. 381, 384, 405-16 (1998) ("The
Order provides a mechanism for prioritizing the interests of Indian tribes ... consistent
with the trust responsibility and tribal sovereignty.").
238. See National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(2) (2000)
(setting forth the circumstances under which a tribe "may assume all or any part of the
functions of a State Historic Preservation Officer"); Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (2000) (setting forth circumstances under which
Indian tribes "shall be considered as a 'State' "); see also Archaeological Resources
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (providing that archaeological projects require the
notification and/or consent of Indian tribes, depending on the circumstances; also
providing that tribes do not need authorization for any archaeological projects on their
land).
239. See supra note 237 (discussing the RCRA).
240. See, e.g., supra notes 237-38 (discussing the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and
NHPA).
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tribes."' Apparently because these developments have improved
governmental services in Indian country, little criticism of this general
policy shift appears in the literature. Perhaps the best evidence of the
success is the policy's endurance; the approach has endured as long as
any major federal Indian policy and shows no signs of coming to an
end.
F. The Unlikely Persistence of the Major Crimes Act
Despite the broad move toward tribal self-governance across the
federal spectrum, the Major Crimes Act has been curiously resistant
to the trend. Indeed, in what may involve the most intrusive aspect of
federal power in Indian country, tribal governmental power over
criminal justice has in many respects gradually diminished and federal
hegemony has actually expanded, even while all other federal
programs have embraced self-determination. To understand the
reasons for this unlikely expansion, one must return to the beginning
of the Self-Determination Era.
In 1968, when Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act,242
Congress limited tribal criminal justice authority in two key ways.
First, Congress required tribes to provide all the criminal procedural
protections noted above, making tribal courts look and behave more
like federal and state courts. Second, the Indian Civil Rights Act
limited tribal court sentences to six months of imprisonment and a
$500 fine.243 In limiting tribes to petty misdemeanors, Congress made
felony jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act effectively
exclusive.2" Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, a tribal government
may still conceivably prosecute an Indian for murder, but federal law
limits the tribal sentence that may be imposed, rendering the offense
a misdemeanor if prosecuted by the tribe.245 Both the substantive and
241. See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, Historical Storytelling and the Growth of Tribal Historic
Preservation Programs, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 86, 86-88 (2002) (stating that
"federal law recognizes that Indian tribes have the right to tell their own stories as part of
the federal decision-making process established pursuant to Section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act" and describing the process set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)).
242. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (now codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303).
243. These limits were raised in 1986 to imprisonment up to one year and a fine of up
to $5000. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
244. In Public Law 280 states, tribes continued to have some level of concurrent
jurisdiction, but tribal jurisdiction was suddenly a lot less robust than the state's
jurisdiction in those states. See generally Soo C. Song & Vanessa J. Jimenez, Concurrent
Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280,47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627 (1998).
245. Some would disagree with the characterization of tribal criminal jurisdiction as
limited to misdemeanors by noting that tribes may, for example, prosecute very serious
offenses such as murder. See Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 971 (characterizing
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the procedural components of the Indian Civil Rights Act have
profoundly intruded on tribal self-government. The substantive
component limited tribal authority markedly over the most serious
offenses on Indian reservations. The procedural component
effectively squelched many traditional ways of addressing criminal
justice by requiring tribal governments to adjudicate criminal justice
in a manner nearly identical to the federal and state governments.246
To the extent that the federal government has a responsibility to
administer criminal justice in Indian country, as the Supreme Court
indicated in Kagama, the Indian Civil Rights Act dramatically
increased that responsibility by making felony criminal justice
exclusive to the federal government. The Indian Civil Rights Act's
strict new limits on tribal jurisdiction obstructed tribes from
addressing new offenses themselves. If an offense deserved a serious
term of imprisonment, only the federal government could provide it.
Thus, there was pressure to expand the Major Crimes Act to address
each new crime problem on Indian reservations, producing a curious
institutional effect on tribal self-determination in the area of criminal
justice.
While the Major Crimes Act expanded by only three enumerated
offenses from the time of its enactment in 1885 to the end of the
Termination Era in the 1960s (from seven to ten listed offenses), the
substantive scope of the Major Crimes Act expanded dramatically
during the Self-Determination Era.247 In 1966, Congress added
certain additional sex offenses, including statutory rape and assault
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA") as limiting tribal jurisdiction over Indians
lands and noting that one provision, "while not expressly limiting the crimes cognizable in
tribal courts, limited the punishments which the tribal courts could impose to six months'
imprisonment or a $500 fine"). The ICRA, 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303, has been amended
such that it limits tribal criminal jurisdiction to a maximum sentence of one year for any
given offense. Thus, although a tribe may indeed have the authority to prosecute one of
its members for murder, federal law limits the tribal sentence to one year. Because federal
law classifies crimes primarily by reference to their maximum term of imprisonment
authorized for the crime, and explicitly defines a crime punishable by one year or less as a
misdemeanor, see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), then it is fair to characterize the criminal
jurisdiction of tribal courts, at least under federal law, as limited to misdemeanors. In
other words, when murder is prosecuted and punished in a tribal court, it is a
misdemeanor.
246. See generally Kirke Kickingbird, In Our Image... After Our Likeness: The Drive
for Assimilation of Indian Court Systems, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 675 (1976) (discussing the
federal effort to shape tribal courts to fit more familiar American models).
247. For earlier scholarship discussing the history of the Major Crimes Act, see Charles
T. DuMars, Comment, Indictment Under the "Major Crimes Act"--An Exercise in
Unfairness and Unconstitutionality, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 695 (1968); Silvestro, supra note
174, at 408-10.
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with intent to commit rape, bringing the putative number of offenses
to twelve . 48  In enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act itself in 1968,
Congress again expanded the reach of the Major Crimes Act by
adding "assault resulting in serious bodily injury" for a total of
thirteen offenses then encompassed within the Major Crimes Act.249
Congress reasoned that, because of the newly imposed limits on tribal
jurisdiction, federal prosecution of such assaults would sometimes be
needed to insure that the punishment would match the gravity of the
offense.250
In the Indian Crimes Act of 1976, Congress amended the Major
Crimes Act to add the crime of kidnapping to the enumerated crimes.
This new offense, together with the assault offense that had been
added as part of the Indian Civil Rights Act itself, raised the total
number of major crimes to fourteen.25'
In the next round of expansion of the Major Crimes Act, in an
appropriations law in 1984, Congress added maiming and involuntary
sodomy, increasing the number of offenses to sixteen. 22  Two years
later, in May of 1986, Congress amended the Major Crimes Act to
include "felonious sexual molestation of a minor," 3 increasing the
number of enumerated offenses to seventeen.
Before the ink was dry on this amendment, however, Congress
enacted a general federal criminal law called the Sexual Abuse Act of
248. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-707, § 1, 80 Stat. 1100, 1100-01.
249. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. V, § 501, 82 Stat. 73, 80.
250. S. REP. No. 90-721 (1967), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1841.
251. Id. In the 1976 legislation, Congress also addressed problems that had arisen
through the incorporation of state definitions of crimes. Because the Major Crimes Act
adopted state law definitions for six of the offenses then enumerated in the Act, an Indian
convicted under the Act was subject to state penalties for several of the major crimes, See
H.R. REP. No. 94-1038, pt. 3, at 5 (1975). A non-Indian offender who was prosecuted
under a related federal statute, however, would be subjected to a less severe penalty
defined in federal law. Because the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits had held such circumstances to violate due process and equal protection,
see United States v. Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955, 959 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 1974); see also James Winston King, Note, The
Legend of Crow Dog: An Examination of Jurisdiction over Intra-Tribal Crimes Not
Covered by the Major Crimes Act, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1490-93 (1999) (discussing
cases), Congress amended the Act to apply federal law definitions and penalties to rape,
assault with intent to commit rape, assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault resulting
in serious bodily injury. Indian Crimes Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-297, § 2, 90 Stat. 585,
585 (1976). Congress continued to allow burglary and incest to be defined and punished
according to state laws since neither was defined in federal law. Id.
252. Joint Resolution of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2141.
253. Act of May 15, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-303, § 1, 100 Stat. 438, 438.
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1986254 that defines a wide range of sexual offenses, ranging from
misdemeanors 255 to death-eligible offenses.25 6 Congress amended the
Major Crimes Act to incorporate all felony provisions of this entire
new chapter of the criminal code and removed references to the
individual sexual offenses that had previously been listed, save
incest.257  This dramatically increased the number of offenses
encompassed within the Major Crimes Act.258  Then, in 1994, in
omnibus crime legislation,259 Congress sought to address the rising
incidence of child abuse in Indian country by adding "assault against
an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years" as one of the
major crimes.26° The Act has not been amended since that time. 261
254. Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 87, 100 Stat. 3620; Pub. L. No. 99-654, 100 Stat. 3660
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2241-2245 (2000)).
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b) (2000) (categorizing sexual abuse of a ward as a Class A
misdemeanor); id. § 2244(a)(4) (categorizing abusive sexual contact of a ward as a Class B
misdemeanor); id. § 2244(b) (categorizing abusive sexual contact of any other person as a
Class B misdemeanor); Diane H. Mazur, Sex and Lies: Rules of Ethics, Rules of Evidence,
and Our Conflicted Views on the Significance of Honesty, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 679, 720 n.151 (2000) (speculating that the drafters included even relatively
minor sex offenses only because they wished to establish a complete system of graded
offenses "so that the more serious the conduct, the more serious the punishment" (quoting
132 CONG. REC. 2598 (1986))).
256. See § 2245 (providing that sexual abuse resulting in death is punishable by
imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death).
257. Prior to the Sexual Abuse Act, the Major Crimes Act criminalized the following
sex crimes: "rape, involuntary sodomy, felonious sexual molestation of a minor, carnal
knowledge of any female, not [the defendant's] wife, who has not attained the age of
sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape [and] incest." See id. § 1153(a).
Following the Sexual Abuse Act, major crimes included "incest" and "any felony under
chapter 109A" which contains the substantive provisions of the Sexual Abuse Act, now
codified at id. §§ 2241-2248.
258. With the caveat about the death penalty described above, it also dramatically
increased sentences for such offenses. The new chapter explicitly and separately listed
many conceivable variants of the known sex crimes. For example, the statute separately
catalogues aggravated sexual abuse by force, id. § 2241(a)(1); aggravated sexual abuse by
threat, id. § 2241(a)(2); aggravated abuse by other means, such as through rendering the
victim unconscious, id. § 2241(b)(1), or administering a drug, id. § 2241(b)(2); and
aggravated sexual abuse with children, id. § 2241(c). The statute takes a similar approach
with other sexual offenses, broadly catalogued as sexual abuse, id. § 2242; sexual abuse of
a minor or ward, id. § 2243; abusive sexual contact, id. § 2244; and sexual abuse resulting in
death. It also criminalizes attempts to commit most of these offenses. Id. § 2241(a). For
those interested in such errands, Chapter 109A includes five different code sections
defining substantive offenses, id. §§ 2241-2245, and at least sixteen offenses that are
distinguishable enough that they would be indicted differently.
259. See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
260. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796, 2043. The law also created a definition for serious bodily injury to give
greater clarity to the major crime, "assault resulting in serious bodily injury." Id.
261. Also in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress
created a tribal option for capital punishment for serious crimes. See id. § 60002(a), 108
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As a result of these changes, and particularly the inclusion of
nearly an entire chapter of the federal criminal code, it is now
something of a fool's errand to attempt to count the number of
offenses enumerated by the Major Crimes Act. For example,
Chapter 109A on sex offenses includes five different code sections
defining substantive offenses and at least sixteen offenses that are
distinguishable enough that they would be indicted differently.262 The
Major Crimes Act thus now encompasses three to four times as many
offenses as in 1885.263
While the Indian Civil Rights Act has stymied tribal efforts to
address more serious offenses and effectively forced tribes to ask
Congress to give federal prosecutors greater authority,6 the overall
impact of the Major Crimes Act has also dramatically increased
because of a trend that has nothing to do with tribes. Mandatory
minimum sentence laws enacted by Congress and other "tough on
crime" legislation has tended to increase the sentences imposed in
Major Crimes Act cases without any particular regard for their
peculiar impact in Indian country.265
G. The Role of the Major Crimes Act Today
To contemporary policymakers in Congress and the executive
branch, the key motivations behind the original enactment of the
Major Crimes Act-expanding federal control over Indian tribes and
facilitating the assimilation of Indians-are anathema today.
Congress has taken extraordinary steps to embrace a policy of tribal
self-determination.
Stat. at 1968 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3598); see also infra notes 277-79 and accompanying
text.
262. See §§ 2241-2245.
263. Murder, which has historically been counted as one offense in common
enumerations of the Major Crimes Act, actually encompasses first-degree murder and
second-degree murder, all in a single subsection in the criminal code. See id. § 1111(a).
Because these are separate offenses that must be indicted differently, it is fair to conclude
that numerical descriptions of the offenses in the Major Crimes Act, which have
commonly counted murder as a single offense, have always been somewhat misleading.
264. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-528, at 5-8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1298, 1301-05 (noting that tribes asked Congress to adopt the 1986 amendments to expand
federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act to address the problem of an increase of
sexual abuse of Indian children which cannot be addressed adequately by tribes because of
the jurisdictional limitations in the Indian Civil Rights Act).
265. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 924 (2003) (providing mandatory minimum sentences for
armed career criminals); id. § 1111(b) (providing death or life in prison for first-degree
murder). Prior to United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the federal sentencing
guidelines were mandatory. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1989).
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Yet, somewhat paradoxically, Congress has repeatedly amended
and thereby implicitly reaffirmed its commitment to the Major
Crimes Act, a law that seems anachronistic in the current era. How
can it be explained that the most aggressive growth of the most
intrusive type of federal power-the power to jail Indians who
commit crimes on Indian reservations-occurred during a time widely
hailed as the Era of Self-Determination? How can it be that a law
that was enacted to facilitate assimilation and increase federal power
over on-reservation Indians has been expanded at a time when the
norms of assimilation and federal control have been widely rejected?
The answers to these questions are complex. In amending the
Major Crimes Act in recent decades, Congress has expressed
different motives that are both much more modest and far less anti-
tribal than in 1885. First, Congress has embraced the notion
recognized in Kagama that it is a federal responsibility to provide
public safety in Indian country.2" Second, in limiting tribal authority
in the Indian Civil Rights Act, Congress handicapped tribal efforts to
address criminal justice. Tribes must now support greater federal
authority if they want serious crime problems addressed.267  Thus,
while most of the original intentions of Congress in the Major Crimes
Act reflected hostility to tribal sovereignty, government, and culture,
recent expansions of the Major Crimes Act have had some tribal
support.
Yet, this tribal support is difficult to understand. A key purpose
of the Major Crimes Act was to achieve assimilation. 268  Though
assimilation may no longer be a positive norm, the Act does not
reflect this dramatic shift in federal policy. It functions in the same
manner as it did in 1885, when assimilation was among its goals.269
And perhaps ironically, it now has a broader scope. The only saving
grace in an age when assimilation is out of fashion is that the Act was
never very effective in achieving assimilation. In any event,
266. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-528, at 2 (noting that amendment of the Major Crimes
Act "is necessary and crucial to effective law enforcement on Indian reservations and to
protect the mental health and physical well-being of Indians"); S. REP. No. 1770, at 4
(1966) (noting that the amendment "will clarify the law in several areas of criminal
jurisdiction and thereby provide for a more logical and fair administration of criminal
justice").
267. Tribes may also see the federal criminal justice system as preempting state
authority in the field of criminal law and thus protecting their freedom from state criminal
authority. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886).
268. See supra Part II.E.
269. See supra Part II.E.
20061
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
assimilation is no justification for this law and never was a reason for
tribal support.
The public safety motives behind the law are somewhat less
hostile to tribal existence, but they do reflect a paternalistic
responsibility that both the federal government and tribes find less
and less appealing in an era of "self-determination." The public
safety justification also begs other very important questions. If
federal programs in virtually every other area of government work
better when tribes operate the programs themselves, then what makes
criminal justice unique? Why ought.criminal justice be an exception
to the general policy favoring self-determination and self-governance
manifest in almost all other areas of federal Indian policy? Perhaps
the most fundamental question is this one: if one strips away the
federal government's repudiated policies of assimilating Indians and
consolidating federal power over Indian tribes, why should it remain
a federal responsibility, and not a tribal one, to provide public safety
and criminal justice in Indian country?
One answer is clear. If the asserted purpose of expanding the
Major Crimes Act is to provide and improve public safety on Indian
reservations, as Congress has indicated,270 then Congress has provided
a rough performance standard against which we can measure the
Major Crimes Act.27' That is, Congress seems to be saying that the
Major Crimes Act is valuable because it serves crime prevention and
public safety. But measuring the Indian country criminal justice
system's performance against Congress's asserted purpose of
providing public safety produces a sorry conclusion. Crime against
American Indians nationwide seems to have risen dramatically even
270. Such clearly has been Congress's intention. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-528, at 2
(indicating that felonious sexual molestation of a minor in Indian country must be added
to the Major Crimes Act to give Indian children "the same protections as other American
children"); Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th Cong. 10
(1973) (describing amendments as helping to "alleviate a serious legal obstacle to federal
efforts to reduce the major crime rate on Indian reservations").
271. The logic of using public safety statistics as a standard for measuring the quality of
the federal Indian country criminal justice system is certainly dubious. Many of my
colleagues have been troubled by my willingness to discuss them in that context. I have no
illusions that a perfect criminal justice system can lower crime rates. I discuss the statistics
in this context only because public safety is the only justification Congress has offered for
expanding federal authority in an area in which federal authority seems highly
anachronistic. When Congress offers a different justification, I will evaluate the results
against that standard.
[Vol. 84
2006] TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINA TION 829
as Congress has steadily expanded the substantive scope of the Major
Crimes Act.272
And the crime rate seems worst in precisely the areas in which
the federal government has been the most aggressive. For example,
despite the federal government's extensive expansion of Indian
country sex crimes in the Major Crimes Act in 1986, the Department
of Justice's own study in the mid-1990s showed that Indian children
under twelve are raped or sexually assaulted at a rate three-and-a-half
times higher than the average child under age twelve.273
The Major Crimes Act has become unmoored from its original
purposes2 4 and yet it is failing, in dramatic fashion, to meet these new
public safety purposes that Congress has described for it.275 Indeed,
Congress may have set for itself an impossible task. Federal laws, at
least if they are based on a theory of deterrence, may not be able to
provide a safer environment anywhere, much less on Indian
reservations. In the social science literature, there is a growing
dissatisfaction with deterrence as a viable foundation for the
particular rules formulated in criminal justice systems. 76 Yet, if crime
272. For many tribes before significant contact with non-Indians, "the cohesiveness and
intimacy of tribal society resulted in a low crime rate." HAGAN, supra note 85, at 18-19.
Crime has become a very serious problem among Indians. See generally LAWRENCE A.
GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AM. INDIANS & CRIME 5
(1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/aic.pdf (presenting an array of
statistics profiling the impact of crime on Indians).
273. GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 272, at 38. During the years 1992-96, Indian
children under twelve were raped or sexually assaulted at a rate of seven incidents per
thousand children. Id. The aggregate rate for children of all races was only two rapes or
sexual assaults per thousand children. Id. While the Department of Justice figures are
aggregated for the whole country and not only Indian reservations, and it is difficult to
draw clear causation from any set of facts, the indicia suggest that the problem is serious.
274. See supra Part III.G.
275. See generally GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 272 (providing statistics that
demonstrate the prevalence of crime and the impact of crime on Indians).
276. See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Best when Doing Its Worst, 91 GEO L.J. 949
(2003). Robinson and Darley raise a number of concerns about deterrence arguments,
some of which apply with particular force in Indian country. For example, they strongly
doubt that criminal defendants generally have a clear knowledge of the law when they act.
Likewise, they doubt whether, even if the defendants have such general knowledge, they
will bring it to bear in their decisionmaking process regarding their actions at any relevant
time before they act. Given that a substantial number of federal Indian country
defendants are intoxicated when they commit offenses, Robinson and Darley's thesis
might be particularly damning to federal Indian country laws that are justified under a
deterrence theory. See Kathy Helms, Navajo Nation No. I in Crime, GALLUP INDEP.
NEWSPAPER, Nov. 1, 2004, at 1 (quoting Assistant United States Attorney Diane
Humetewa as stating that "[n]inety-nine percent of the cases referred to [the Arizona
United States Attorney's Office] involve alcohol or substance abuse"), available at http://
redwebz.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=762; see also U.S. SENTENCING
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deterrence and public safety are not being served by the Act, then the
only purposes it may serve are preservation of federal control over
Indians and coercion of Indians into assimilating federal norms. But
both of these purposes are long out of fashion and indeed
incompatible with modern policy norms. In other words, the Act may
now be lacking any viable theoretical foundation.
H. Modest Steps Toward Tribal Self-Determination in Federal
Criminal Justice
Despite the expansion of the Major Crimes Act, a small but
important development toward tribal self-determination occurred in
1994 when Congress enacted omnibus "tough on crime" legislation
which included three measures designed to align federal criminal
justice with contemporary Indian policy by instilling a greater level of
autonomy in Indian government. This legislation reinvigorated the
death penalty for federal crimes,277 created a federal "three strikes
law" that provides for life sentences for repeat offenders, 78 and
lowered from fifteen years to thirteen years the age at which a
juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult in the federal system. 279 In
each of these provisions, however, Congress treated Major Crimes
Act offenses specially.280 As a result, the federal death penalty now
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP 42 (Nov. 4, 2003),
http://www.ussc.gov/NAAG/NativeAmer.pdf ("Across the board, alcohol plays a
significant role in all violent crime arising in Indian country.").
277. Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI,
§ 60002(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1968 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (2000)).
278. See id. tit. VII, § 70001, 108 Stat. at 1984 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(6))
(providing for mandatory life imprisonment for persons convicted of their third serious
violent felony or drug offense, but providing each tribe with criminal jurisdiction the
option as to whether the provision will apply to Indian country offenses occurring within
the tribe's jurisdiction).
279. See id. tit. XIV, § 140001, 108 Stat. at 2031 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5032). Federal
law generally provides that a juvenile at least fifteen years old may be treated as an adult
under the federal criminal laws under certain circumstances. This section of the 1994
amendments provides that a juvenile thirteen years old may be treated as an adult if he
commits particular crimes of violence or possesses a firearm during the commission of an
offense. The tribal option provision allows the relevant tribal government to determine
whether the juveniles can be transferred at age thirteen or whether the age fifteen serves
as the absolute floor for federal juvenile transfers for cases arising in Indian country.
280. Perhaps in recognition of what a tremendous intrusion it is to tribal sovereignty,
the death penalty has always been treated specially in Indian country. In 1897, Congress
abolished the death penalty for all federal crimes except murder, rape, and treason,
thereby decreasing from sixty to three the number of federal crimes for which an offender
could be put to death. See Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, § 1, 29 Stat. 487, 487 (1897);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 339 (1972); see also Rory K. Little, The Federal Death
Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's Role, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 367 (1999) (describing the history of capital punishment in the
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applies to an Indian prosecuted for murder under the Major Crimes
Act only if the tribal government with jurisdiction over the
reservation has opted in to the system.28' Under this "tribal option"
provision, a tribal government wishing the federal death penalty to
apply in applicable federal major crimes prosecutions on its
reservation must affirmatively so elect.282 Apparently, only one tribe,
the Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma, has done so. 283  The tribal
option also applies to the federal "three strikes" law2 4 and the
provision allowing thirteen-year-olds to be treated as adults in the
federal system.8 5
As a result of these changes, the federal system now allows a
very limited tribal voice to be heard in a criminal justice system that is
run not by Indian tribes but by outsiders. In this respect, the tribal
option approach represents a clear recognition by Congress that what
is appropriate policy for the rest of the country may not be
appropriate for each Indian reservation. By giving tribes a choice, it
creates some measure of self-determination within the narrow, but
important, area of criminal justice. But if self-determination makes
sense here, why limit it?
United States). For rape under the Major Crimes Act, the abolition law went further; it
specifically prohibited imposition of the death penalty against an Indian prosecuted for
rape and instead directed federal courts to sentence such a defendant to a term of
imprisonment. See Act of Jan. 15, 1897, § 5, 29 Stat. at 487 ("[A]ny Indian who shall
commit the offense of rape within the limits of any Indian reservation shall be punished by
imprisonment at the discretion of the court."). Thus, after 1897, an Indian prosecuted for
a major crime could be put to death only if the offense was murder.
281. See Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI, § 60002(a),
108 Stat. 1959, 1968 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3598). This law provides that the federal
death penalty will apply to crimes arising under the federal Indian country criminal
statutes only if the Indian tribe with misdemeanor criminal jurisdiction opts to allow the
capital sentences. In arguing for this provision on the Senate floor when it was first
introduced in a previous Congress, Senator Daniel Inouye, co-chairman of the Senate
Indian Affairs Committee, indicated that this amendment "accords to tribal governments
a status similar to that of the State governments, namely that tribal governments, like
State governments, can elect whether or not to have the death penalty apply for crimes
committed within the scope of their jurisdiction." 137 CONG. REC. 98, 982-83 (1991).
282. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, tit. VI, § 60002(a).
283. See Sac and Fox Nation Resolution SF-95-50 (adopted Feb. 23, 1995) (on file with
author). In the same document, the Sac and Fox Nation also "opted in" to the three
strikes provision and the provision that allows thirteen-year-olds to be prosecuted as
adults, both of which are discussed infra.
284. See supra note 278.
285. See supra note 279.
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IV. SELF-DETERMINATION AND CRIMINAL LAW
While the absence of tribal self-determination in criminal justice
may offer insight into the reasons for the federal government's failure
to achieve the public safety results anticipated by Congress, in
contrast to the success shown in federal programs that have embraced
tribal self-determination, these federal laws present another problem
from the perspective of tribal governments and communities. Given
the fundamental importance of criminal justice systems and the
overwhelming power over individuals and the community that these
systems represent, one might assert that no real measure of tribal self-
determination can be achieved if self-determination is absent in the
provision of criminal justice for serious offenses. Moreover, federal
criminal laws may simply not work well when applied to a community
whose values they do not represent. This Part explores these
questions.
A. The Theory of Tribal Self-Determination
Self-determination springs from prominent theories of liberal
political philosophy that dominated the twentieth century.286 In both
its general form and its specific application to tribes, it recognizes that
human liberty and equality are served when people and communities
can freely shape their own governing institutions and align these
institutions with the will of the people. The theoretical justifications
for tribal self-determination are related to government agency: "Self-
determination has had the predictable effect of improving the
accountability of government officials to their citizens across many
dimensions. 2
87
Internationally, self-determination has been a key facet of
redress for the harmful legacy of colonization.288 Similar inclinations
animate the move toward self-determination in the United States.
Colonization has an important legacy that the United States may well
have to endure as long as Indian tribes continue to exist. This may
well be a very long time. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
286. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
103-08 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the development of notions of self-determination for
indigenous peoples).
287. Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty:
The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule, at 37 (Joint Occasional Papers on Native
Affairs, 2004-03, Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University (2004)), available at http://jopna.net/pubs/
JOPNA06_MythsandRealities.pdf.
288. ANAYA, supra note 286, at 105-06.
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Indian tribes were here for centuries before the United States came
into being.289 And as tribal leaders have recognized so often that it
has become clich6, Indian tribes plan to occupy this land long after
the United States is gone.
Given the utter failure of numerous federal initiatives to
assimilate Indians and terminate tribal governments during the last
two centuries, the persistence of Indian tribes as separate
communities no longer seems subject to doubt. The genius of the
tribal self-determination rhetoric for federal policymakers is that it
recognizes the inevitability of Indian tribes and allows policymakers
to embrace Indian tribes. It thus avoids the inexorable failure that
past assimilationist policies have faced.
Self-determination, as a federal policy, has also apparently been
good for tribes. Through tribal self-determination-oriented
amendments to federal laws, tribes now have the opportunity to
define the standards that apply to the air that the tribal community
breathes.29" Tribes can set the water quality standards for the waters
that run through the reservation, even when those standards create
tremendous economic costs for upstream, off-reservation users.291
The tribes' school boards, rather than federal education officials,
make the key decisions about the curriculum that will be offered in
Indian schools.2 92 And tribes can make their own decisions about how
to allocate health care and many other social services among its
members.293 Tribes even provide their own policing organizations and
can adjudicate misdemeanor criminal cases.294
These initiatives have improved the ability of each Indian tribe to
further its own tribal values and ultimately to map its own cultural
289. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (recognizing that Indian tribes predate
the United States Constitution and therefore are not subject to the Bill of Rights).
290. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2000).
291. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1370, 1377(d); see City of Albuquerque v. Browner,
97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir.
1998) (upholding the EPA's approval of water quality standards adopted by the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes of the Flathead Reservation).
292. Allison M. Dusiass, Let No Indian Child Be Left Behind: Re-Envisioning Native
American Education for the Twenty-First Century, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 819, 862-64 (2001);
Eileen M. Luna, Seeking Justice: Critical Perspectives of Native People, 4 GEO. PUB.
POL'Y REV. 129, 130 (1999).
293. Rose L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Native
Americans: Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 211, 223
(1997).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004) (holding that the
congressional act overruling Duro v. Reina was a lawful exercise of congressional plenary
authority over Indian tribes and properly allowed tribe to assert criminal authority over
Indians who are not tribal members).
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destiny. According to self-determination proponents, these initiatives
have also improved the quality of service to Indian communities in
each of these areas.295
Yet tribes lack the right to define or punish serious criminal
offenses. In light of the adoption of principles of self-determination
in so many other areas, the lack of tribal control over felony criminal
justice stands out as an unusual exception. Indeed, the power to
prosecute and imprison an Indian for an on-reservation crime against
another Indian is perhaps the single most aggressive use of federal
power against an Indian that routinely occurs in the modern era. It
thus simultaneously works one of the greatest existing federal
intrusions on internal tribal affairs. The question then, is whether
criminal law is central to the achievement of tribal self-determination.
B. Criminal Law and Community Norms
The notion that substantive criminal law is important to
community self-determination has long been settled as a matter of
criminal law theory. Unlike laws that regulate mere civil interaction,
criminal laws are implicated only when the community has identified
conduct so serious that it harms the community as a whole.296
Harmful activity constitutes a crime and not merely a civil wrong only
if it is serious enough to be worthy of the most formal and solemn
pronouncement of the community's moral condemnation.297 In that
respect, through criminal laws, the community defines what it values
and what it abhors.298 In essence, criminal laws codify the moral
foundations of the community. Criminal law is, in that sense, critical
to community identity. One could argue that criminal law is thus
more fundamental than civil or regulatory laws to community identity
and community self-determination.
The importance of criminal law in articulating norms presents
itself in a myriad of ways. From the Introduction, recall the differing
laws of Texas and California on use of deadly force in defense of
295. Cf. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where Does Economic Development Really
Come From? Constitutional Rule Among Contemporary Sioux and Apache, 33 ECON.
INQUIRY 402, 402 (1995) (theorizing that a tribe is likely to be much more successful when
the governance structure "matches" its cultural heritage).
296. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401,402-06 (1958).
297. Id.
298. See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
515, 537 (2000) ("Law expresses the values and expectations of society; it makes a
statement about what is good or bad, right or wrong.").
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property.299 In codifying and reifying each state's decision as to
whether to privilege the use of deadly force against a trespasser, each
state reflects as much or more about its respective norms as to the
relative value of private property and human life as it does about
"crime." That is what criminal laws do-they help communities
prioritize evils and assert, protect, and defend their core values.
Classical scholars since at least Emil Durkheim have recognized
a clear and strong relationship between community values and
criminal law.3" As Durkheim described, criminal laws are the
tangible embodiment of the community's sacred moral values.30 1
Criminal laws help socialize the community by reinforcing those
norms that are reflected in the legal structure and help mold broader
behavioral norms.3" Though criminal laws immediately ensure that
the community's values will be honored either through compliance or
enforcement, criminal law and punishment also have a broader social
"impact on sensibilities, solidarities, and social relations . . . far
beyond the offender in the dock or the inmate in the prison cell.""3 3
In addition to mere instrumental functions, criminal laws also
have an expressive function-they declare and describe community
values-and in that context have a broader and more diffuse effect on
societal norms."° In asserting that criminal law is infused with "social
meaning," for example, Professor Kahan cites the federal law
criminalizing flag burning as expressing important community values
about "the virtue of patriotism and the relative status of veterans and
dissidents in our society.""3 5 To be more explicit, a flag-burning law
regulates expression by limiting what a society views as civil discourse
and free speech. Criminal laws express what the community values
and what it will-and will not-tolerate. In this way, criminal laws
constitute an important window on the community and are an
important means of community self-expression and self-definition.3 6
299. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., DURKHEIM, supra note 18, at 80-81 ("We can, then..., say that an act is
criminal when it offends strong and defined states of the collective conscience.").
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. David Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, in 14 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115, 118 (Michael Tonry ed., 1991).
304. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLEcU-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 95-96 (1995) (citing the sociology works of Emil Durkheim and Norwegian
scholar Johannes Andenaes).
305. Kahan, supra note 19, at 363.
306. One scholar has characterized these "expressive functions of criminal law" as
including a lot of different tasks, such as changing the meaning of certain actions, changing
the sanctions and rewards for certain actions and behaviors, causing actors to internalize
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Criminal law affects and reinforces societal norms by producing
public discourse about those same norms when the laws are enacted
and when they are enforced.307 Indeed, Durkheim believed that the
process of criminal law and punishment was designed less as a
measure to reform the individual offender and more as a means of
reinforcing the social order among the broader community.3"8
C. Federal Criminal Justice and Tribal Values
The notion that criminal law has a strong effect on community
norms was, at least to some degree, understood by federal lawmakers
when the Major Crimes Act was enacted in 1885. Policymakers
explicitly sought to use federal prosecutions under federal criminal
laws to change the social norms of Indian tribes; indeed, that policy
initiative was a stated motivation for the law.309 Now that self-
determination is the dominant normative principle in federal Indian
policy, such policy initiatives are out of favor. But the legal and
sociological dynamics of the Major Crimes Act continue to operate as
in 1885. In other words, though the stated justifications for the Major
Crimes Act may have changed, many of its normative effects have
not.
The Major Crimes Act regime assaults the notion of tribal self-
determination in several important ways. First, it creates a scheme in
which a community alien and external to the tribal communities
defines the local offenses within the tribal community.310 Second, it
serves as the substantive mechanism of a criminal justice system in
which the alien community adjudicates the everyday violations of the
alien norms, thereby reifying the alien norms on a daily basis through
the process of criminal justice.3 ' Third, in setting and then
favored norms and to reject disfavored ones, and thus changing the behaviors and the
preferences of actors. Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of
Expressive Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 134 (2003).
307. And some forms of enforcement speak louder than others. See Eric Posner &
Dan Kahan, Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Strengthening the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 382 (1999) (noting the "expressive
superiority" of imprisonment to mere fines).
308. Garland, supra note 303, at 123.
309. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
310. See Christine Zuni Cruz, Four Questions on Critical Race Praxis: Lessons from
Two Young Lives in Indian Country, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2152 (2005) (questioning
the results of a justice system in which "the parameters are being set by those who come
from outside the community").
311. Id. at 2150 ("The Major Crimes Act not only takes the individual out of the
community but places the judgment of the wrongdoing in a framework outside the
community that experienced the wrong.").
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reinforcing through prosecutions the norms of an alien community, it
effectively preempts the Indian communities' own opportunity to
formally articulate their norms about serious offenses and to have
them reinforced through a criminal justice system. Each of these
harms should be considered separately because each has its own
pernicious effects.
Consider first the extension of federal norms to Indian country.
The Major Crimes Act was an explicit attempt to replace tribal norms
and processes with federal norms and processes that Congress
deemed to be superior. In that sense, the very existence of the Major
Crimes Act-normative standards set by outsiders-is the antithesis
of tribal self-determination.
Many of the harms are not intentional and are, in fact,
inadvertent. The Major Crimes Act is not a law of general
applicability; it has only limited geographic coverage and only
authorizes prosecutions of Indians.312 Yet, rather than addressing the
unique circumstance that might prevail in such cases, the scheme
borrows from the general federal penal framework. Thus, when
significant changes are made to the general federal law, such as
adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines, for example,313 Indians
are often directly affected. Yet Congress is unlikely to have
considered the particular effect of these laws in Indian country and on
Indian tribes and Indian defendants314 (or Indian country crime
victims, for that matter).
The negative effects of federal law on Indian communities are
perhaps most troubling when Congress enacts laws during a "moral
panic" '315 to address a serious perceived problem, such as those related
312. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153 (2000).
313. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 276, at 16 (discussing apparent failure
of the Sentencing Commission to consider the views and concerns of tribal governments
and Native American offenders in drafting the original sentencing guidelines); see also
United States v. One Star, 9 F.3d 60, 61 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the Commission
had not considered the circumstances involving life on Indian reservations in setting
sentence guidelines).
314. Cf United States v. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1238 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
count with a mandatory sentencing enhancement not mentioned within the Major Crimes
Act for use of a firearm during a crime of violence was lawfully included in an Indian
country indictment because there was no indication that Congress intended to exempt
Indians from this "924(c)" sentence enhancement provision).
315. "Moral panic" generally refers to circumstances in which public passions, and
sometimes, hysteria, are stirred in reaction to troubling events. Several scholars have
recently focused on laws produced in response to moral panics. See generally PHILIP
JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN
AMERICA 6-8 (1998) (discussing social policy related to sex crimes from the 1890s to the
1990s); MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
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to violent crimes, like carjacking or sex offenses, without specifically
considering the effect of the law in Indian country. In the PROTECT
Act of 2003,316 for example, Congress enacted a law to deal with child
pornographers and those who commit so-called "travel offenses"-
that is, predators who meet children (often through the Internet) and
then travel to meet with the child to commit a sex offense.3 17 In
Congress's zeal to increase penalties for such conduct,318 it created
several new provisions that may also have significant effects in Indian
country, which lies on the opposite side of the digital divide. 319 Yet,
Congress failed to consider Indian country cases specifically to
evaluate whether the provisions were appropriate for tribal
communities.3 20 Like innocent bystanders inadvertently hit by a stray
bullet during a drive-by shooting, Indian country communities and
defendants are sometimes impacted by federal initiatives that have
nothing to do with Indian reservations. 321  As a result, an Indian
defendant who has never had access to a computer may serve a
lengthier sentence because Congress is attempting to target
defendants who use computers to commit sex offenses.
Despite the absence of the Indian country community in the
process of articulating the normative values that go into such laws, the
Indian country community must endure imposition of the norms
through their inclusion in the background rules of federal criminal
law that are applied in Indian country cases.3 22 These federal norms
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 93-95 (2004) (discussing gun control laws stemming from
the King and Kennedy assassinations of the 1960s).
316. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.A.).
317. Id. § 105, 117 Stat. at 654; id. § 501, 117 Stat. at 676.
318. Among other substantive provisions, the PROTECT Act changed the statute of
limitations for any offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnapping, of a child
under the age of eighteen by providing that the limitations period shall not preclude
prosecution during the life of the child. Id. § 202 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3283 (2003)). It also created a "two strikes you're out" provision creating a mandatory
life imprisonment sentence for child sex offenders convicted of a second serious offense.
Id. § 106 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(e) (2003)).
319. Leonard Baynes, Deregulatory Injustice and Electronic Redlining: The Color of
Access to Telecommunications, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 263 passim (2004) (describing the
widespread lack of access on Indian reservations to telecommunications-including the
Internet-and even personal computers).
320. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 276, at 22-24.
321. Cf TONRY, supra note 315, at 215 (noting that minority defendants are often
adversely affected by policies that are not intentionally directed at minority groups but
which have a disparate impact on them).
322. Cf id. (demonstrating the disparate impact certain laws have on black and
Hispanic criminal defendants).
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become, in effect, enforceable rules on the reservation without any
tribal adoption of the norms or values that justify them.
While the Major Crimes Act and the general federal laws with
which it interfaces impose formal criminal norms, consider just one
example of informal norm application that also arises in such a
system. In the federal system, the President of the United States can
issue a pardon to a convicted defendant.323 Whether to issue such a
pardon is a matter of discretion, or in other words, a matter of
informal application of executive grace, presumably based on the
President's belief in whether a defendant is deserving of mercy,324
Here, the President will not decide whether to exercise mercy based
on tribal norms, but based on his own norms about mercy, which may
be quite different than tribal beliefs. Discretionary decisions, such as
decisions by prosecutors as to whether to prosecute, which may have
a tremendous impact upon everyone involved in the crime, are often
driven by informal norms. Impositions of such informal alien norms
on tribal communities are thus no less harmful than imposition of
formal ones through law.
In contrast to the assaultive nature of applying outside norms to
tribal communities, turn now to the converse problem, the
retardation of the tribe's own development and preservation of its
norms. In effect, federal felony criminal justice law preempts tribes
from addressing serious offenses themselves. To be sure, in the
absence of the Major Crimes Act, Indian tribes would likely
criminalize each of the offenses currently listed in the Major Crimes
Act. Tribes would surely criminalize murder, for example. 2 ' But in
doing so, tribes might define the offenses differently. They might
prioritize the offenses differently. Moreover, they would be able to
make their own choices as to the relative value of, for example,
private property, trespassing and trespassers, human life, and free
speech.326 Tribes might also adjudicate the cases differently and
323. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
324. But see TONRY, supra note 315, at 212-13 (describing President Clinton's midnight
pardons of 2001 as notorious because of appearances that they were driven by concerns
other than mercy, such as political cronyism and campaign contributions).
325. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896) (refusing to disturb Cherokee
murder conviction).
326. Declaration of these values comes both in substantive offenses and in defenses. In
the federal system, common legal defenses such as self-defense, defense of others, and
defense of property are not codified, but develop as a matter of federal common law. In
other words, federal judges tend to fashion the legal rules, often by borrowing from state
law. See United States v. Brown, 287 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing cases and
discussing the substantive content of the defense of self-defense); United States v. Keiser,
57 F.3d 847, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1995) (wrestling with different state formulations on one of
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create dramatically different punishment or sentencing regimes.327
And a criminal code that "fail[s] to mesh with the moral consensus of
the regulated community will lack credibility." '328
Perhaps the most striking example of the imposition of federal
norms and the intentional disregard of tribal community norms
occurs in the area of sentencing. Under the federal sentencing
guidelines, federal authorities not only impose their own values in
Indian country, including mandatory minimum sentences for certain
crimes, they also purposely ignore legitimate tribal expressions of
tribal values. Indeed, as explained in greater detail in another
article,329 the federal sentencing guidelines require federal judges to
count state and federal criminal convictions to assess an Indian
offender's criminal history for purposes of determining the severity of
a federal sentence.33 ° Yet, federal judges are instructed to ignore
convictions rendered by the Indian offender's own tribal courts.'
From the normative viewpoint presented here, the federal
sentencing guidelines are not only wrong, but also perverse. For
reasons previously articulated,332 the convictions rendered by a tribal
court in the offender's own community would seem to have far
greater legitimacy than federal convictions levied under the laws of an
external community. Thus, tribal convictions ought to be treated with
greater respect than state and federal convictions, not less.
To put it more plainly, criminal law is critical. Given its key
place in defining a community, it is far more important for a tribe to
define its felonies than its water quality standards. Yet, under current
the self-defense elements and ultimately declining to adopt any of them); United States v.
Iron Shield, 697 F.2d 845, 847-48 (8th Cir. 1983) (deciding whether it is appropriate to
instruct on involuntary manslaughter and self-defense on the same facts in an Indian
country case).
327. There is a large body of literature in restorative justice based on the practices of
Indian tribes and other indigenous cultures. See generally Robert Yazzie, "Hozho
Nahasdlii"--We Are Now in Good Relations: Navajo Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 117 (1996).
328. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes,
95 Nw. L. REV. 1, 15 (2000).
329. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403
passim (2004).
330. Id. at 413-16; see also Kevin Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission's
Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 209, 209, 215-17 (2005) (arguing that
tribal court dispositions are more legitimate for Indian defendants than state or federal
convictions). The Federal Sentencing Reporter article is followed by short comments from
several federal judges evaluating the argument. Id.
331. Washburn, supra note 329, at 442.
332. See supra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
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federal law, a tribe can do the latter, but not the former.33 Because of
the importance of the criminal law in defining community values and
demarcating the boundaries of allowable conduct, the community's
absence in these key areas of criminal justice necessarily calls into
question the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the criminal laws.
When the law fails to mirror the community's values, this lack of
alignment undermines the law's moral credibility and "weakens the
law's ability to dictate proper conduct. '34 People will not conform to
laws that they do not view as morally credible.335 This theory, more
than any other, may explain the problems that the federal
government has encountered in applying federal laws in Indian
country. Federal laws in Indian country simply have a legitimacy
problem.
In addition to denying self-determination to Indian communities,
the current federal structure also speaks loudly about the status of
tribes as governments. In a slightly different context, Indian law
expert Sam Deloria has noted that the limited authority of tribes to
incarcerate criminal offenders is one of the clearest commentaries on
the existence and scope of tribal sovereignty.336 It is quite limited as
to some very serious matters.337 Indeed, though the Supreme Court
has regularly affirmed that Indian tribes are a good deal more than
"private voluntary organizations, ' 38 the structure of Indian country
criminal justice might raise doubts in some quarters.
Classical sociologist Max Weber once made a statement similar
to Deloria's. Weber postulated that one of the key distinctions
between a "state," that is, a government, and other kinds of social
organizations is that a state "monopolizes the legitimate application
of violence for its coercive apparatus. ' 3 9 If the use of various forms
of coercive violence, such as incarceration and the death penalty, is
333. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
334. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 201-02 (1995).
335. Id. at 202.
336. Sam Deloria is the Director of the American Indian Law Center and made this
assertion at a Federal Bar Association Indian law conference in the context of the lack of
tribal authority to jail non-Indians, commenting indirectly, in other words, on Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
337. Id.
338. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877,892 (1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140 (1982); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
339. MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 342-47 (Max Rheinstein ed.,
Max Rheinstein & Edward Shils trans., 1954). Professor Carole Goldberg graciously
recommended review of Weber's work in this context.
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one of the indicators of "statehood," then the limitations on tribal
coercive power, such as those set forth in the Indian Civil Rights Act,
must raise questions as to whether tribal governments are sovereigns
at all. Using Weber's theory, and as reflected in Supreme Court
opinions, tribes lack this key indicator of "statehood" or sovereignty
and are, at best, only "quasi-sovereign" states.34° In other words, just
as full self-determination is not achievable under the existing scheme,
tribal sovereignty is necessarily substantially limited as long as the
federal scheme and its norms predominate.
In short, the imposition of the federal laws not only implicates
the effectiveness of the federal criminal justice system; it effectively
denies the Indian community an important outlet for self-
determination and self-definition. While this Article does not
necessarily argue that the Major Crimes Act must be abolished, it is
important to understand the ramifications of the Act for the Indian
country communities that it regulates. Rather than exercising self-
determination, tribes now live with criminal laws that reflect the
values-and relative value judgments-of an external community. In
that respect, the Major Crimes Act represents a vestige of
colonialism, or at least of policies favoring federal control and forced
assimilation. In other words, it embodies the outmoded values and
erroneous federal policies that tribal self-determination initiatives
seek to remedy.
V. "DECOLONIZING" FEDERAL INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
While the foregoing discussion has measured the federal Indian
country criminal justice regime against the norms of modern federal
Indian policy and found it utterly inconsistent with those prevailing
norms, the logical next step is to determine the solution, a task that
some of my colleagues might describe as "decolonizing" Indian
country criminal justice.
A. The Rhetoric of Decolonization
The rhetoric of "colonization" and "decolonization" has been
used widely and colorfully in the discourse of American Indian law
and policy,"l but it has recently come under attack by Professor
340. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196.
341. Professor Rob Williams may have pioneered the use of such rhetoric at least in
the context of American Indian law scholarship. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra
of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man's Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 222-23 [hereinafter Williams, Algebra];
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Robert Laurence.342 Professor Laurence argues that the rhetoric of
colonization ill suits the modern American experience.343 Laurence
argues that "colonialism" is more appropriate for circumstances in
which the invaders are only temporarily "in country," or, at a
minimum, consider themselves ex-patriots from the motherland
which they still view as "home."3"4 Under this view, the rhetoric of
colonialism ceased being accurate when the then-colonists decided
that they were not going back to England, declared independence,
and recast themselves as "Americans." '345 In other words, the
American experience is not one of colonization, but one of invasion.
To some scholars, the rhetoric of de-colonization connotes some
sort of radicalism, but the term is no more radical than current
mainstream federal Indian policy. Consider the rhetoric in context:
presumably, each tribe had full self-determination prior to European
contact (and the only interference in a tribe's ability to self-govern
came from other tribes). Each tribe gradually lost much of its
independence and authority to self-govern as the American continent
was colonized and then settled.346 Modern federal efforts to restore
tribal self-determination are really designed to address the ill effects
of colonization and to restore to tribes some of the governmental
powers that existed prior to colonization. In that sense, the federal
policy which has been cast in the affirmative as "increasing tribal self-
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Pihatas, and Apache
Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W. VA.
L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1994). And many others have adopted it as well. See Robert N.
Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal
Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 85-86 (1993); Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous
Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121,124, 132, 143 (2004) (discussing the
similarities between rape and colonization); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present. Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107
HARV. L. REV. 381, 381-85 (1993); Robert B. Porter, Legalizing, Decolonizing and
Modernizing New York State's Indian Law, 63 ALB. L. REV. 125, 136-43 (1999).
342. Robert Laurence, Antipodean Reflections on American Indian Law, 20 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 533, 539-43 (2003). Professor Laurence's critique of the use of rhetoric
in Indian law is not entirely different from Professor Randall Kennedy's criticism of the
use of highly charged rhetoric such as "lynching" and "genocide" by African American
advocates. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 9 (1997).
343. Laurence, supra note 342, at 542.
344. Id. at 539-40.
345. Id. at 539-43; see also Robert Laurence, Don't Think of a Hippopotamus, 40
TULSA L. REV. 137, 140-45 (2004) (generally contrasting the invasions of Iraq and
America).
346. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 544-45 (1823) (discussing
the doctrine of discovery and the loss of exclusive tribal authority over tribal lands).
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determination" might just as easily be cast in a more negative sense as
"addressing colonization" or "decolonizing. 3 47
Whether Professor Laurence's thoughtful opposition to rhetoric
of colonization is based on its perceived radicalism or simply its
historical inaccuracy, it rings hollow in the context of the federal
Indian country criminal justice system. Federal law enforcement
officials and prosecutors do not view Indian country as their "home,"
but as a place that they visit only from time to time to exercise outside
authority.3 48 Indeed, Indian country is not a place where these federal
officials have settled permanently and intend to remain.349 Much of
Indian country constitutes separate territory that federal authorities
visit only to take suspects into custody to try them under laws not of
the Indian communities' own design. Accordingly, even under
Professor Laurence's narrow view of what "colonization" ought to
mean,350 this Article argues that the rhetoric fits the circumstances of
federal Indian country criminal justice. Colonization continues to
exist, at least in some respects, in this corner of the world.
Nevertheless, while decolonization might itself seem to suggest
the solution to the colonization problem, this too is only rhetoric.
The rhetoric may help describe and understand the problem in a
normative manner, but it is not very helpful in identifying a solution.
Indian country criminal justice is an area in which solutions are
notoriously difficult to find. The best evidence may be the work by
Professor Robert Clinton. Writing on the federal Indian country
criminal justice system in the mid-1970s, Professor Clinton published
an initial article that carefully surveyed the history and the formation
of the federal Indian country jurisdictional scheme.3 1  He then
published a second article describing the scheme in its current form,
famously characterizing it as a "jurisdictional maze. ' 352  And he
promised a third article on "possible reforms in the structure of
347. Cf Catherine Brown, Are Indigenous People Entitled to International Juridical
Personality?, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 189, 196 (1985) (reporting remarks by Hurst
Hannum, indicating that "self-determination, legally speaking, is little more than a code
word for decolonization").
348. FBI agents that investigate the most serious Major Crimes Act offenses are almost
always located in Resident Agency offices outside the reservation in border towns such as
Bemidji, Minnesota, or Farmington or Gallup, New Mexico. See Washburn, supra note 2,
at 719.
349. Certainly this is a key part of the argument that their exercise of authority is
illegitimate.
350. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
351. Clinton, Development, supra note 28, passim.
352. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 28, passim.
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criminal jurisdiction on criminal lands." '353 Though Clinton's work has
since been regarded as the most important work in this area and has
been cited by the Supreme Court,354 Clinton's third article on possible
reforms never materialized.
Now thirty years after Clinton's work, the crime problems have
become even more serious, and the jurisdictional maze has become
even more complicated with the fall and then partial resurrection of
tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers in Oliphant, Duro and
Lara.3 5  But, in an era of vigorous tribal self-government, solutions to
some of the problems may be more obvious now than in 1975.
B. Self-Determination in Criminal Law?
One key question is whether criminal law is an appropriate
subject in which to pursue tribal self-determination. A common
concern is that criminal law is different than other governmental
programs services-it involves imprisonment of human beings. In
other words, some might say that the stakes are simply too high to
allow tribes to have control over criminal justice.
Such an argument is based on mistrust of tribal governments and
it is, thus, antithetical to the tribal self-determination norm. The high
stakes involved in criminal justice represent an even greater
justification for self-determination. For if tribes do not have self-
determination in this most important of areas, they do not have
meaningful self-determination. Defining good and evil is simply more
central to self-determination than virtually any other governmental
endeavor. Indeed, other than education, it is hard to imagine a
government function or service more vital to self-determination.
Indeed, this question was answered long ago in American
criminal jurisprudence when the United States adopted the Bill of
Rights and made crystal clear the important role that the community
plays in American criminal justice.356 In other words, while the self-
determination norm has animated Indian law and policy only for the
last thirty years or so, the principle has animated American criminal
justice since even before the American Revolution. Arguments
353. See Clinton, Development, supra note 28, at 952 n.9.
354. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 (1990); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City
of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
355. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004); Duro, 495 U.S. at 679;
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
356. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 111-14 (1998) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of public
trials was intended to protect the accused and the public itself).
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favoring self-determination in criminal justice were presented in a
clear and firm voice in the Declaration of Independence3 7 and were
later enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. 8 Indeed, it was concern for
principles of community self-determination that drove the
organization of American criminal justice system around the use of
grand and petit juries.359
In the modern era, self-determination has taken hold in the
mainstream of criminal justice in other ways, too. The "community
policing" revolution is premised on the notion that public safety
improves when local communities are involved in the basic
instruments and institutions designed to provide criminal justice.36 In
poor communities, law enforcement and criminal justice may offer
the most common interaction between regular citizens and the
government.361
The notion that criminal justice is an inappropriate venue for
self-determination initiatives is thus contrary to the theories of self-
determination that animate modern Indian policy, constitutional
criminal justice, and modern notions of policing and good
government in general. The notion that criminal justice is
fundamentally different from other important government services
seems simply arrogant.
C. Is Self-Determination the Appropriate Norm?
Another key question is whether tribal self-determination is the
appropriate standard against which to measure a criminal justice
system or an appropriate norm to address dysfunction in such a
system. Indeed, criminal law theorists might say that the crucial
inquiry is not how to increase self-determination for Indian tribes but
how to improve criminal justice or increase public safety for tribal
communities. Two responses and a disclaimer follow.
First, rather than approach these questions from the perspective
of crime or criminal justice policy, this Article seeks to treat criminal
justice as an aspect of federal Indian policy and to ask why this single
subject matter should be treated strikingly differently than other
357. See Washburn, supra note 2, at 742.
358. Id.
359. See AMAR, supra note 356, at 105-10.
360. See James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2-3 (2004); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and
Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1531-39 (2002); Tracey L. Meares, Praying
for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1600 (2002).
361. See Jonathan Simon, Introduction: Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1416 (2002).
[Vol. 84846
TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION
federal Indian policies and programs. In all other areas of federal
Indian policy, self-determination initiatives seem to have improved
delivery of services to Indian people,362 partially by making the
providers of those services more directly accountable to tribal
leadership and thus to the tribal community, and partially by insuring
that delivery of services occurs in a culturally appropriate manner.3 63
In other words, if criminal justice and public safety are viewed as
public goods that governments provide, we can conclude from
existing studies that self-determination will facilitate the provision of
such public goods. We may simply not need to choose between self-
determination, on the one hand, and public safety or criminal justice,
on the other.
Second, as discussed previously,3" American criminal justice
theory and jurisprudence and modern notions of good government
policy are premised on broad principles of self-determination. Public
trust in the criminal justice system, and therefore the legitimacy of
that system, are likely to increase when self-determination is realized.
Now, the disclaimer: from a criminal justice standpoint, it would
be highly useful to conduct an extensive comparative analysis of the
institutional competency of the federal, the state, and the tribal
governments and their respective suitabilities for the task of
providing criminal justice in Indian country. Eminent criminal law
scholar Frank Zimring, for example, has encouraged me to conduct a
comparative analysis of federal, tribal, and state governments to try to
determine which government could best address the problems I have
identified and meet the needs of Indian country. Surely such an
analysis would be useful to determine where best to locate certain
functions, a level of detail that I will take up another time. Such an
analysis would be fruitful and may well be key to understanding how
to improve the existing system, especially if it carefully surveyed the
options as to each key function. The disclaimer is that this Article
will save such a review for a later time and uncritically accept the
notion that tribal self-determination has been viewed as a positive
norm by Indian policymakers in virtually all other areas of Indian
policy and simply assume that the application of such a norm to the
362. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where's the Glue? Institutional and Cultural
Foundations for American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. SocIO-ECON. 443, 446-47
(2000).
363. Joseph Kalt and Stephen Cornell have pioneered much of the academic work
supporting this notion. See id. at 462-67.
364. See supra notes 356-61 and accompanying text.
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criminal justice regime could only lead to improvement above the
status quo.
D. Applying Self-Determination Principles in Indian Country
How could the norms of tribal self-determination and tribal self-
governance be applied in the criminal justice arena? In its purest
form, the theory of tribal self-determination is that Indian tribes
themselves should design, operate, and provide the normative
standards for their governing institutions. In federal Indian policy,
however, reality sometimes deviates from this ideal, and self-
determination often tends to be embraced in a more circumscribed
fashion. In light of this dichotomy between principle and reality, two
general approaches are worthy of consideration.
In its purest ideal, self-determination would militate toward
outright repeal of the Major Crimes Act and the Indian Civil Rights
Act. A more practical approach might involve careful review of the
existing federal institutions of criminal justice and amendment of
those systems to make strategic modifications that would increase
meaningful tribal involvement. Some thoughts are set forth below,
though these thoughts are intended only to begin the discussion, not
end it.
1. Decolonization as "Defederalization": Repeal of the Major
Crimes Act
Though numerous academic commentators outside of Indian law
have criticized recent efforts to "federalize" crime in general,365
Indian tribes suffered from federalization long before most
Americans began to give the issue any attention. Moreover, Congress
has rarely attempted to arrogate elsewhere anything approaching the
scope of authority it exercises in Indian country.366 The most obvious
solution would involve repeal of the Major Crimes Act, taking the
365. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC1. 39, 51 (1996) (noting that federalization
of crime has affected the federal courts by "tak[ing] up a disproportionate share of total
federal judicial resources"); Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez,
Federalization of Crime, and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 79-82 (1997) (arguing that the Constitution's domestic violence clause
prohibits the federal government from wielding "federal authority" over crime); Susan A.
Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 837-40 (2000)
(arguing that federalization of crime upsets the allocation of power between the state and
federal governments mandated by federalism).
366. Cf. Frickey, supra note 149, at 14 (noting that Congress can abrogate treaties with
Indian tribes and seize Indian land).
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federal government out of the business of adjudicating local crime
between Indians on Indian reservations, and repeal of the Indian
Civil Rights Act, liberating tribes from federal limitations imposed
upon their own management of internal affairs. Thus,
defederalization may represent an attractive option.
In light of the fact that most of the Major Crimes Act's key
purposes have been discredited and rejected and indeed are
inconsistent with current federal policy, it is difficult to understand
how Congress would justify passage of the Major Crimes Act if
presented with the Act for the first time today. Exclusive federal
jurisdiction over serious offenses between Indians in Indian country
seems fundamentally inconsistent with both the rhetoric and theory
of tribal self-determination and at odds with modern notions of good
government.
From the standpoint of federal Indian law and policy, however, a
host of difficult issues would arise as to repeal of the Act. First, as
often occurs in Indian country, questions regarding financial
resources loom large.367 Second, the Major Crimes Act is merely one
component of a broader federal Indian country criminal justice
regime that also includes federal jurisdiction over offenses by Indians
against non-Indians, or non-Indians against Indians. Given the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to recognize tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians,368 some sort of external criminal justice
system would need to be retained, at least for certain purposes. One
question would be whether that system should be federal, state, or
tribal, or some sort of hybrid. One could imagine Indian defendants
being tried in tribal courts and non-Indian defendants being tried in
state courts with removal to federal courts in the event of a legitimate
fear of discrimination. Or perhaps federal authority should remain
intact in full for such crimes. In some ways, it is far easier to justify
federal jurisdiction when a non-Indian is involved as a victim or
perpetrator. In such cases, the non-Indian provides a federal nexus in
that there is an actor who is somewhat outside the scope of internal
tribal governance.369 Indeed, many of the early treaties with tribes
367. Because of resource issues, few of the tribes with the most serious public safety
and criminal justice problems would be able to undertake this important responsibility in
one fell swoop. Yet, any solution that would involve substantially increasing
appropriations to Indian tribes or shifting substantial resources from a federal cabinet
level, such as the Department of Justice, might face significant political opposition.
368. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
369. This area is, however, ripe for argument. Though it is somewhat simpler to justify
federal involvement in cases in which a tribal member and a nonmember are involved in a
dispute on an Indian reservation, it is by no means clear that the federal government,
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provided for extradition in such cases. 37" This kind of federal
involvement is not nearly as intrusive in tribal governance.
Nevertheless, splitting responsibilities between governments is
inelegant and remains one of the most complicated aspects of the
current system. Indeed, it is what allowed Clinton to correctly
characterize the current regime as a "jurisdictional maze. 371
Third, to a substantial degree, federal jurisdiction serves as a dam
that prevents state jurisdiction from flowing on to Indian reservations.
Repeal might implicitly involve removal of the preemptive force of
federal law, giving state authority the ability to creep in insidiously
and assert itself on Indian lands. As a result, repeal of the Major
Crimes Act and retrocession of federal jurisdiction to tribes might
ultimately cause greater erosion of tribal authority, frustrating the
very purpose of repeal. Indeed, disputes between states and the
federal government about jurisdiction over Indian lands might
become disputes between tribes and states. It is hard to believe that
tribes would have the same success in holding back state jurisdiction
as the federal government has had. Tribes simply lack the prestige
and power in American courts that the United States has.
In other words, while the ideal of tribal self-determination might
suggest that repeal of the Major Crimes Act is the obvious solution,
reality dramatically complicates the picture. Federal Indian law has
rarely developed according to careful and principled application of
theory to fact but rather has followed a much more practical
approach.372 Accordingly, it is worth briefly considering more modest
approaches.
2. Reform of the Federal Indian Country Regime
In Indian country, incrementalism often triumphs over vast
paradigm shifts in federal policy.373 Indeed, unilateral repeal of a
rather than the tribal government, ought to have primary jurisdiction. In attempting to
limit this discussion to the Major Crimes Act, this broader question must remain beyond
the scope of this analysis.
370. See Clinton, supra note 59, at 122.
371. See Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 504-05.
372. Professor Frickey has convincingly argued that practical reasoning often trumps
theory and doctrine in the Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence. See Philip P.
Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal
Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1201-03 (1990).
373. A well-known sudden shift in Indian policy was Public Law 280. See supra notes
189-97 and accompanying text. Indian tribes have chafed at the unilateral imposition of
state jurisdiction and the failure to recognize an exclusive role for tribal sovereignty and
tribal self-determination. Likewise, states have been dissatisfied with Public Law 280
because the law failed to provide federal funding for the states that assumed 280
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federal program has rarely been the key mechanism for increasing
tribal self-determination. The prevailing approach has been to allow
tribes to apply to run those programs. In many contexts, the legal
structure remains the same, but the tribal governments are given
contracts or "compacts" to stand in the shoes of the federal
government. Even despite the strong official rhetoric of self-
governance, the United States has maintained an active governmental
role in the affairs of Indian tribes as they undertake federal
programs.374
In the environmental area, for example, Congress has not simply
forfeited complete responsibility and authority over reservation
environments to Indian tribes. Rather, the United States has enlisted
tribes in a shared and carefully defined (and some might even say
circumscribed) role in implementing federal policies and programs.375
Statutes such as the Clean Water Act have not been repealed as to
tribes; rather, they have been amended to give Indian tribes the
opportunity to exercise limited governmental roles under the
supervision of the Environmental Protection Agency.376 In several
statutes, tribes are offered the opportunity to be treated in the same
manner as states in implementing federal environmental programs.377
Under the Department of the Interior's self-determination and self-
governance programs, Interior has retained the power to reclaim
federal programs from Indian tribes implementing them in a manner
not deemed acceptable to federal officials.37 8
jurisdiction. Thus, Public Law 280-and state jurisdiction-is not likely to be a promising
model for reform. See generally GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 190 (discussing the
problems associated with Public Law 280 and Indian tribes).
374. In some circumstances, tribal participation is justified by the notion that the tribal
involvement will help the tribe "build capacity." See, for example, the Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13) (2000), which defines "municipality" to include an Indian
tribe, presumably to allow Indian tribes to apply for federal grants available to
municipalities.
375. See supra notes 231-41 and accompanying text.
376. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2000 and Supp. II 2002).
377. Id.
378. See 25 U.S.C. § 458aa (2000); see also Elizabeth Lonah Homer, Implementing the
Self-Determination and Self-Governance Act, Course Materials for the 28th Annual
Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Apr. 10,
2003), at 177, 187 (addressing retrocession to the United States of tribally contracted or
compacted programs and services).
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Thus, in deference to the "actual state of things" '37 9 in Indian
policy, repeal of the Major Crimes Act is unlikely. Envisioning
reforms and improvements in a manner more consistent with self-
determination norms is likely to be much more productive. Even
modest reforms might improve the provision of criminal justice in
Indian country. A careful reform agenda ought to involve a
comprehensive and methodical review of each of the key institutions
of federal criminal justice and a creative approach toward creating-
or improving-tribal involvement in each of those institutions.
For example, consider the. federal. prosecutor. The federal
prosecutorial function could be reformed to improve self-
determination in Indian communities. One scholar has suggested
deputization of tribal prosecutors in federal courts. 8 ° Perhaps the
Indian communities should have the responsibility of drafting the
guidelines that federal prosecutors use to determine whether to
exercise their discretion to indict Indian country cases. Or maybe
federal Indian country prosecutors should be subjected to routine
formal evaluation by the tribal community. Or possibly tribal
communities should be able to select which federal prosecutors are
assigned to their reservations. Or perhaps there should be a separate
presidentially-appointed "United States Attorney for Indian
Country" within each district or even an Assistant Attorney General
for Indian country with nationwide responsibility at the national level.
In sum, there are myriad potential reforms.
3. A Third Way
In the final analysis, it is difficult to evaluate how well tribes
would provide criminal justice if the Major Crimes Act was repealed.
379. For two contrasting viewpoints on the "actual state of things" in Indian country,
see Robert Laurence, Learning To Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the
Indian Nations, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 413, 435-37 (1988); Williams, Algebra, supra note 341, at
291-94; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not To Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply
to Professor Laurence's Learning To Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the
Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439,456-57 (1988).
380. Larry Cunningham, Note, Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: Protecting Indian
Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 2187, 2188-89 (2000). Such appointments have
been common since at least the mid-1990s. Christopher Chaney, while serving as a tribal
prosecutor for the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, was designated as a "Special Assistant United
States Attorney" in the District of New Mexico, for example, before becoming an
Assistant United States Attorney in Utah in 1997. Interview with Christopher B. Chaney
(Sept. 10, 2002) (notes on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Such appointments
have largely been matters of courtesy, however, and the experiment has not been pursued
aggressively enough to determine whether they might actually make a substantive impact
in improving criminal justice in Indian country.
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Since tribes simply have not had the chance to demonstrate their
capacities, we have no empirical way, ex ante, of determining whether
tribal systems would actually function better or worse than the federal
system.381' And on the other hand, even substantial reforms to the
existing federal system would not address the fundamental normative
problem involved when Congress sets the rules that govern within
Indian country.
A middle ground between outright repeal and reforming the
existing system might involve a limited number of pilot programs, or
an "opt out" approach in which tribes with appropriate capacities
could leave the federal system and undertake their own felony
criminal justice systems.38z The mere existence of choice represents
improved self-determination. By merely having the policy discussion
at the tribal level, some of the goals of self-determination are served,
even though the tribes are not the primary actors as they are when
they compact for the federal functions to undertake these
responsibilities themselves.
Given the seriousness of the crime problem in Indian country
and the persistence of the dissatisfaction with the quality of the
federal system, more creative thinking ought to be brought to bear on
these problems.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the Major Crimes Act constituted a sudden
and dramatic avulsion of federal authority into an area formerly
within exclusive tribal control. Yet, the gradual accretion of the
substantive scope of the Act during the era of tribal self-
determination has been far more significant in expanding the reach of
federal authority. The result has been steady erosion of tribal power
over internal tribal affairs and tremendous accretion of federal
authority occurring precisely at the time when the federal
381. My colleague Phil Frickey has cautioned me about the nirvana fallacy in this
context: comparing a flawed federal system to an idealized tribal system. In keeping with
such caution, I would expect to find occasional gross deviations from justice in tribal
systems, just as we see similar deviations occasionally in state and federal systems. Given
that state and federal courts have occasionally issued death sentences to defendants who
were later determined to be factually innocent, see Bruce P. Smith, The History of
Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1185, 1215-18 (2005), it is fair to say that tribal
courts likely cannot do anything more extreme or irreparable than state and federal
courts.
382. Cf Vollman, supra note 129, at 411 (citing the sophisticated legal infrastructure of
the Navajo tribe as evidence that some tribes should be allowed to "piecemeal expan[d]
... criminal authority").
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government purports to be revitalizing tribal authority and restoring
tribal power.
In making felony criminal jurisdiction in Indian country a federal
responsibility, the United States undertook an important
responsibility that it has never effectively discharged.
Simultaneously, it has left tribal governments, and consequently tribal
communities, with little or no involvement in the felony criminal
justice systems on' their own reservations. By its very design, the
federal criminal justice regime alienates, rather than embraces, the
communities that it is intended to serve, leaving tribal governments
disconnected from some of the key institutions of governance. In that
respect, the Major Crimes Act represents an unfortunate
anachronism in an era of tribal self-determination. And each
prosecution under that Act, to some degree, furthers an anachronistic
policy that is designed to displace and destroy tribal governments.
Since the federal government long ago discarded intentions of
increasing federal power over Indians or of assimilating them, the
original purposes of the Major Crimes Act are no longer legitimate.
In this respect, the Indian country criminal justice regime seems to be
the last living sprig on a branch of federal Indian law and policy that
has withered and died.
Congress no longer speaks in terms of assimilation or furthering
federal control over Indians. Congress in recent years has suggested
that the Major Crimes Act regime is designed to help provide safe
reservations. If improving public safety and criminal justice in Indian
country is the goal, however, the Major Crimes Act is an abject
failure. Many parts of Indian country are more dangerous than ever,
and in some places the crime problem seems to be growing direr.
The federal Indian policies and programs that have flourished in
recent years have been those that have embraced the more modern
notions of tribal self-determination and self-governance. Indeed,
tribal self-determination may provide the normative foundation of a
solution. Not only has self-determination improved the delivery of
federal services in many other areas of Indian policy, it represents a
core value running though American criminal jurisprudence. Indeed,
it is tragically ironic that criminal justice is the only important area of
federal Indian policy in which tribal self-determination has not been
embraced.
To function properly, criminal justice in Indian country must be
decolonized. Policymakers should embrace the values of self-
determination and work to give Indian communities meaningful
access and control of the instruments of criminal justice. Moreover, if
[Vol. 84
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tribal self-determination is an end in itself, criminal law is absolutely
crucial to its achievement.
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